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ABSTRACT
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is working on a project to generate 
hydrogen by high temperature electrolysis (HTE). In such an HTE system, safety
precautions need to be taken to handle high temperature oxygen at ~830°C. This 
report is aimed at addressing oxygen handling in a HTE plant. Though oxygen
itself is not flammable, most engineering materials, including many gases and 
liquids, will burn in the presence of oxygen under some favorable 
physicochemical conditions. At present, an absolute set of rules does not exist 
that can cover all aspects of oxygen system design, material selection, and 
operating practices to avoid subtle hazards related to oxygen. Because most
materials, including metals, will burn in an oxygen-enriched environment, 
hazards are always present when using oxygen. Most materials will ignite in an 
oxygen-enriched environment at a temperature lower than that in air, and once 
ignited, combustion rates are greater in the oxygen-enriched environment.
However, these hazards do not preclude the operations and systems involving
oxygen. Oxygen can be safely handled and used if all the materials in a system
are not flammable in the end-use environment, or if ignition sources are 
identified and controlled. In fact, the incidence of oxygen system fires is 
reported to be low with a probability of about one in one million.
This report is a practical guide and tutorial for the safe operation and
handling of gaseous oxygen in a high temperature electrolysis system. The 
intent is to provide safe, practical guidance that permits the accomplishment
of experimental operations at INL, while being restrictive enough to prevent 
personnel endangerment and to provide reasonable facility protection.
Adequate guidelines are provided to govern various aspects of oxygen
handling associated with high temperature electrolysis system to generate 
hydrogen. The intent here is to present acceptable oxygen standards and 
practices for minimum safety requirements. A summary of operational 
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Oxygen Handling and Cooling Options in 
High Temperature Electrolysis Plants
1. INTRODUCTION TO OXYGEN HANDLING 
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is working on a project to generate hydrogen by high temperature
electrolysis (HTE). A conceptual diagram of such a system is shown in Figure 1. Steam at ~830°C is 
electrolyzed in a solid oxide electrolyzer to produce hydrogen and oxygen. Figure 2 shows the concept in 
the laboratory setting. In such an HTE system, safety precautions need to be taken to handle high
temperature oxygen at ~830°C. This report is aimed at addressing handling oxygen related to a HTE 
system.
Though oxygen itself is not flammable, most engineering materials, including many gases and 
liquids, will burn in the presence of oxygen under some favorable physicochemical conditions. The 
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Glenn Research Center have developed safety manuals [1-2], all or part of which have been 
devoted to the safe handling of oxygen. These standards will be frequently cited in this report.
At present, an absolute set of rules does not exist that can cover all aspects of oxygen system design,
material selection, and operating practices to avoid subtle hazards related to oxygen. Some oxygen 
systems give apparently normal service for decades before circumstances arise to yield an incident or fire. 
Because most materials, including metals, will burn in an oxygen-enriched environment, hazards are 
always present when using oxygen. For most materials, the ignition temperature in an oxygen-enriched 
environment is lower than in air, and once ignited, combustion rates are greater in this environment. 
However, these hazards do not preclude the operation of systems involving oxygen. Oxygen can be safely
handled and used if all the materials in a system are not flammable in the end-use environment, or if 
ignition sources are identified and controlled. In fact, the incidence of oxygen system fires is reported 
to be low with a probability of about one in one million (ASTM Committee G4.05).
This report is a practical guide and tutorial for the safe operation and handling of gaseous oxygen
in a high temperature electrolysis system to generate hydrogen. The intent is to provide safe, practical 
guidance that permits the accomplishment of experimental operations at INL, while being restrictive 
enough to prevent personnel endangerment and provide reasonable facility protection. More 
extensive safety precautions should be employed wherever possible. These guidelines should in no 
way be considered as relaxing and overriding any occupational safety or health standard imposed by
other regulatory organizations and agencies. Where precisely quantifiable direction is not possible, 
oxygen system design, material selection, and operating practice guidelines are based on proven
experience and logical technical judgment. A summary of operational hazards, along with oxygen
safety and emergency procedures, are provided. 
.
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Figure 1. Conceptual diagram of the INL hydrogen (and oxygen generating) plant. 
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of INL laboratory set-up to generate hydrogen and oxygen.
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2. HAZARDS RELATED TO OXYGEN 
In this section, various hazards associated with oxygen, their causes, and their assessments are
discussed.
2.1 Hazards in Oxygen System
ASTM MNL-36 [1] and Vidal Vázquez [3] have identified the major hazards in many industries as 
fire, explosion, and toxic release. Of these three, the most common is fire, but explosion is particularly
devastating in terms of fatalities and property loss. Explosion can be a result of sudden release of built-up
pressure. However, a fire can also eventually lead to explosions. A hazardous material can be defined as a 
substance that poses an unacceptable risk to health, safety, or property. Absolute safety can never be 
achieved due to the inherent properties of some materials and chemicals. Therefore, risk can only be 
reduced to an acceptable level. Hazards can be categorized by combustibility or flammability, volatility,
toxicity, and reactivity. Hazard assessment is a thorough, orderly, and systematic approach for 
identifying, evaluating, and controlling hazards of processes involving chemicals. There are many
organizations that have developed lists, definitions, and classifications related to flammable chemicals,
including Department of Transportation (DOT), National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA), 
Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Some
organizations establish their classifications with qualitative descriptions, but most classifications are 
based on physical/chemical properties such as flash point (Tf) and boiling point (Tb).
2.2 Parameters and Conditions Responsible for 
Hazards in Oxygen Handling 
Flammability/Ignition: Vidal Vázquez [3] has defined several terms related to oxygen flammability.
There is not a single parameter that defines flammability, but some of the relevant properties are flash 
point (Tf), lower flammable limit (LFL), upper flammable limit (UFL), and auto-ignition temperature 
(AIT). The LFL and UFL are the minimum and maximum volumetric concentrations of fuel in air that set 
the endpoints of the flammability range. The LFL represents the initiating point of flame propagation, and 
the UFL represents the extinguishing point due to the shortage of oxygen or excess of fuel. The AIT is the 
minimum temperature required to cause self-sustained combustion. The flash point of a flammable liquid 
is the temperature at which the vapor pressure of the liquid provides a concentration of vapor in air that 
corresponds to the LFL. At a temperature called the fire point temperature (which is a few degrees above 
the flash point temperature, Tf) enough vapor is generated to be ignited. However, the flash point
temperature is used by regulatory authorities to rate the flammability hazards of chemicals. Based on 
these ratings, specific regulations and guidelines for usage, transportation, and storage are developed. The 
relationship among these properties is presented in Figure 3. The degrees of flammability according to
National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) and US Department of Transportation (DOT) are presented 
in Table 1 [3].
Ignition occurs when a combustible material is heated to ignition temperature. The ignition 
temperature of a material in oxygen systems is not an absolute physical property, but it depends on many
related parameters. As yet, no single test can be applied to all materials to give an absolute value of 
ignition temperature. In fuel-oxygen mixtures, lower energy input is needed for ignition as compared to 
the energy input needed in fuel-air mixture. For example, ASTM MNL-36 [1] gives minimum spark
energy required for the ignition of hydrogen in air as 1.8 x 10-8 Btu at 1 atm, but only 1.1 x 10-9 Btu in an 
oxygen environment. Several potential sources may exist that can cause ignition of fuel-oxygen system.
These sources are heat of compression, friction, heat from impact, other flame source, shock waves from
a tank/pipe burst, hot exhaust from another source of heat, electrical ignition, electrical short circuit,
spark, static electricity resulting from solid particle interaction, and build-up of electrical charge by 
various electrical components, etc.
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Figure 3. Relationship between different flammability properties (Vidal Vázquez [3]).
(Adapted from Bureau of Mines Bulletin [4])
Flash Point: The flash point of a flammable liquid is the temperature at which the vapor pressure of 
the liquid provides a concentration of vapor in air that corresponds to the LFL [4]. It is assumed that the 
flash point is the temperature at which enough vapor has been generated to be ignited. The regulatory
organizations consider the flash point as the critical parameter to rate the flammability hazards of 
fuels/chemicals. Based on these ratings, specific regulations and guidelines for usage, transportation, and 
storage of a fuel/chemical are developed. Liquid and gaseous oxygen must be stored, handled, and used 
so that life and health of the workers is not jeopardized and the risk of property damage is minimized.
Fire and explosion: Pure oxygen does not burn by itself, but makes fires burn faster and hotter. To 
prevent evolution of the enhanced fire, any location where oxygen is stored or used must be relatively free 
of flammable and combustible items. Examples of these materials include alcohols, solvents, petroleum
products, and papers. Open flames, sparks, or high heat from smoking items, radiant heaters, and certain 
appliances must be controlled. The highest safe temperature for the oxygen tank and accessories is 125°F. 
Oxygen-supported combustion of most engineering materials is a potential fire hazard. Some oxygen
systems have given apparently normal service for decades before circumstances combine to yield an 
incident or fire. Materials that burn very slowly or not at all can burn vigorously or even explosively in
oxygen. For example, stainless steel and some other metals, Teflon, and silicones, which are generally
regarded as fire resistant, can burn easily in oxygen under favorable conditions. Oil, grease, asphalt,
kerosene, cloth, wood, paint, tar, and dirt can react violently with oxygen. Violent fires in high-pressure
oxygen systems have resulted from component failures, entrained metal particles in the flowing gas 
system, and rapid metal-to-metal frictional contact within components. Leaking or spilled liquid oxygen
can form dangerously high concentrations of oxygen gas. In an oxygen-rich environment, clothing may
become saturated with oxygen, ignite readily, and burn violently.
4
5Hazards of Cryogenic Oxygen and Oxygen Mixing with other Gases: There are health hazards 
associated with very low temperatures of liquid oxygen. Frostbite results when such a liquid or a non-
insulated pipe containing it contacts the skin. The use of cryogenic oxygen can cause additional design 
and exposure problems, such as trapped cryogenic fluids developing explosive high pressure rupture 
potentials, oxygen-saturated clothing, cryogenic flesh burns, impact ignitions, and numerous other 
concerns. When liquid oxygen is trapped in a closed system and refrigeration is not maintained, pressure 
rupture may occur. Oxygen cannot be kept liquid if its temperature rises above the critical temperature of 
-181.4° F (154.6 K).  
Inhalation of argon or nitrogen mixed with oxygen can even cause death. Breathing pure oxygen for 
limited periods of time (an hour or two) will not have any toxic effects; however, the upper respiratory 
tract may become irritated if the gas is very dry. Very low temperatures of liquid oxygen can assist in 
trapping foreign matter and impurities that may react with oxygen at a later time. 
If odorless and colorless gases or hydrocarbons inadvertently dissolve in oxygen, several problems 
can occur. If oxygen and a flammable gas are ignited, the reaction may proceed violently, even 
explosively. 
Table 1. Classification of Flammability According to DOT and NFPA [2].
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2.3 Hazard Assessment
It is suggested in ASTM MNL-36 [1] that a hazard assessment should be performed on any
component or system intended for oxygen service in a thorough, orderly, and systematic manner for 
identifying, evaluating, and controlling hazards of processes involving oxygen or any other chemical. To 
perform an experiment or implement a process using oxygen systems, the operator must define, develop, 
document, implement, and maintain necessary policies and procedures to govern and control all phases of 
a product or systems that involve the use of oxygen. The hazards analysis should include review of the 
system design, component design, installation, operating procedures, protective measures, in-service 
inspection requirements and maintenance procedures, cleaning, service, decommissioning, and 
emergency procedures. Safety of an experiment or a process using oxygen can be considerably increased 
by adopting and instituting practices that have been developed and used successfully by the developers of 
ASTM MNL36 [1]. The hazards analysis should perform the following activities:
? Determine the most severe operating conditions 
? Evaluate flammability of materials at the operating conditions 
? Evaluate ignition sources 
? Compare the above to existing data and perform configurational and component tests if required to 
determine and demonstrate safety margins to ignition thresholds. 
The hazards analysis should consider the most severe operating conditions and their effects upon the
system. It should include the effect of operational anomalies and single-point failure modes such as 
ignition, combustion, explosion, or the effect of oxygen enrichment of a normally ambient environment.






? Frictional related parameters (load, speed) 
? Multiple duty cycles.
All oxygen system components must be evaluated in the worst possible scenario. If the most severe
single point condition cannot be determined in terms of material ignition and flammability, then the range 
of operating conditions must be considered. The flammability of the materials used in the oxygen system
shall be evaluated. If a material is not flammable, then it may be used safely even if ignition sources exist. 
If the material is flammable and if no ignition source exists, the material may still be used safely. 
However, if an ignition source exists, the materials and designs should be compared to available data 
to determine safety margins to the ignition thresholds of the material. Potential ignition sources shall be 
evaluated to ensure no hazards exist that could cause an unacceptable risk to personnel, property, or 




Several steps should be taken to achieve maximum oxygen safety. The primary consideration for 
resolving oxygen hazards shall be to eliminate them by proper design. The generally accepted steps in the 
design process, including design, quality, and acceptance testing, are provided in Chapter 4 of ASTM
MNL-36 [1]. Some of the system design ideas are taken from NASA safety manual [2]. Hazards that 
cannot be eliminated by design should be controlled by taking the following corrective actions in this 
order of precedence: 
? Design for minimum hazard and allow for verification of cleanliness to the required level 
? Install safety devices 
? Install alarms and warning devices
? Develop administrative controls, including special procedures and training 
? Provide protective clothing and equipment.
When hazards are reduced or eliminated in a plant, the process not only becomes safer, but also 
emissions to the environment are reduced or eliminated. Environmental damage resulting from the release 
of chemicals/gases during an incident can be significantly reduced. In general, any liquid with flash point 
or boiling point temperatures lower than ambient temperature constitutes a major fire hazard than a liquid 
with values above ambient temperature.
3.1 Inherently Safe Design
Oxygen systems should be designed by selecting materials that are ignition and combustion-resistant
at the most severe operating conditions. Safe oxygen systems must include designs for preventing leaks, 
eliminating ignition sources, establishing and maintaining a clean system, avoiding cavitation (in liquid 
oxygen systems), and preventing resonant vibration. Vidal Vázquez [3] has provided guidelines for an 
inherently safe design approach to remove or reduce hazards at the source, instead of controlling them
with add-on protective barriers. However, for an oxygen system under consideration, one principle that 
can make a significant difference is to design the system in order to minimize the effects of the release of 
hazardous chemicals or energies. The principle of inherent safety that best applies to flammable mixtures
is “substitution,” which implies replacing a hazardous substance by a less hazardous one. The flash point 
of a mixture is a function of composition and its behavior is highly dependent on the individual
components of the mixture. Therefore, substituting one of the components of the mixture will affect the 
flash point of the mixture. Flammability measures the potential to generate fire and explosions, and flash 
point is the flammability property used to classify or categorize flammable liquids. The flash point of a 
mixture varies with composition, and its behavior strongly depends on the components of the mixture.
Therefore, by changing one of the components of the mixture, the flash point of the mixture is modified.
3.2 Two Safety Barriers
At least two failure-resistant, independent barriers shall be provided to prevent a given failure from
escalating into a major disaster. Thus, at least two independent failures have to occur simultaneously
before there would be a potential danger to personnel or a major disaster.
3.3 Fail-Safe Design
The equipment, power, and other system services shall be designed and verified for safe performance 
in the normal and severe operational conditions. The design should be such that if there is a failure, the 
8
system should revert to operating conditions that are safe for the personnel and will cause the least 
property damage. Additional components may need to be incorporated into the design to prevent system
failure.
3.4 Automatic Safety Devices
System safety valves, flow regulators, and equipment safety features shall be installed to 
automatically control hazards.
3.5 Alarms and Warning Systems
Instrumentation to monitor the parameters relating to the storage, handling, and use of oxygen that
may endanger personnel and cause property damage should be incorporated into oxygen system design. 
There should be warning systems if these parameters reach the unsafe zone. Warning systems shall
consist of sensors to detect abnormal conditions, measure malfunctions, and indicate incipient failures. 
Data transmission systems for caution and warning systems shall have sufficient redundancy to prevent 
any single-point failure from failing an entire system.
3.6 Formal Procedures
All oxygen operations and procedures shall be performed by technically knowledgeable and formally
trained personnel. Personnel involved in design and operations will carefully adhere to the safety 
standards and must comply with regulatory codes. System cleaning procedures shall be adopted from
proven methods successfully used in industry or at INL.
3.7 Personnel Training
Personnel assigned to handle/use oxygen or to design equipment for oxygen systems must become 
thoroughly familiar with the physical, chemical, and hazardous properties of oxygen. 
3.8 Operator Certification
Operators shall be certified (per institutional requirements) to handle liquid and gaseous oxygen under 
normal and emergency conditions.
3.9 Safety Review
All oxygen design, handling, and test operation activities shall be subject to an institutional
independent safety committee review and subject to a permit issued by the responsible safety committee. 
In addition, any modification to an oxygen handling system or research laboratory shall be brought to the 
attention of the appropriate safety committee for review prior to operation.
3.10 Reducing the Probability of the Oxygen Hazard 
The severity of oxygen hazard can be minimized by reducing the severity of the system's operating 
parameters and using materials and designs best able to withstand the oxygen environment. Because so
many parameters influence the choice of the material for oxygen-service, several possibilities exist. 
Therefore, using as many as possible of the following steps in concert minimizes the overall probability
of a significant incident (ASTM Committee G4.05):
? Maintain cleanliness
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? Adopt safe operating practices, such as opening valves slowly and using valves with higher flow
control capacity to limit downstream pressurization rates 
? Isolate or shield the hardware to reduce personnel exposure to the oxygen system
? Minimize flow velocity (by using larger diameter flow conduits) 
? Use fire-resistant materials that improve the system's susceptibility to fire hazard. Materials used in 
oxygen service should be selected based on the following criteria:
- Materials with high ignition temperatures and high ignition impact thresholds
- Materials resistant to flame propagation 




Safe use of oxygen requires the control of potential ignition energy mechanisms within oxygen 
systems by judiciously selecting ignition-resistant materials and system designs maintaining scrupulously
clean systems, and using appropriate operational procedures. Oxygen can react with nearly all materials
that are not already fully oxidized. The following criteria are given by NASA [2], ASTM MNL-36 [1],
and European Industrial Gas Association [22].
4.1 Factors Affecting Selection 
For selection of a material for use with oxygen, the circumstances that cause oxygen to react with the 
material need to be understood. Most materials in contact with oxygen will not ignite without a source of 
ignition energy. When energy input exceeds the configuration-dependent threshold, ignition and 
combustion may occur. Therefore, safe use of oxygen requires the control of potential ignition energy
mechanisms within oxygen systems by judiciously selecting ignition-resistant materials. Ignition 
mechanisms which can result in pipeline failures include: 
? Particle impact ignition caused by impingement of metallic or non-metallic materials with the metal
components of the pipeline
? Adiabatic compression, acoustic resonance and flow friction, which create temperature increase
? Ignition initiated by the combustion of organic materials, or contaminants entrained in the oxygen 
flow
? Friction caused by rubbing, as in a valve between adjacent moving and stationary parts 
? Electric arcing between metallic components due to static electricity or lightning which generates 
enough energy to ignite metallic or non metallic materials.
When the ignition mechanism has started, the combustion can propagate through the kindling chain.
Once ignited, the combustible material or component generates heat, which can, depending on many
factors, ignite the bulk material of the pressure envelope. The rate and extent of the propagation of the fire 
along the pressure envelope will depend on the thickness and the flammability of the material. The use of 
exempt materials will limit the propagation of the combustion by interrupting the kindling chain. The rate 
and extent of the propagation of the fire is also influenced by oxygen parameters such as pressure, purity,
temperature, and the total oxygen inventory available to support combustion. For pressures below 30 psig 
(0.21 MPa), experimental data show that the combustion rates of potential materials used in oxygen
pipeline components such as carbon steel are very low and decrease with decreasing pressure. This effect 
has contributed to the excellent service experience demonstrated by properly designed carbon steel 
components in selected very low pressure oxygen applications. Many causes of fire can be avoided and 
their consequences reduced by effective design practices. Other causes of fire may be due to unsuitable
maintenance and operating practices, such as: 
? Overheating due either to a process failure or to an oxygen leakage from the system resulting in an 
external fire adjacent to the pipeline 
? Accidental mixing with fuel, due to either a process failure or contaminant introduction during
maintenance work. 
4.2 Oxygen Compatible Materials
Major progress has been made toward enabling oxygen systems to be compatible with higher 
pressures, temperatures, etc. by designing the oxygen systems that protect or shield the more susceptible
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nonmetallic components from direct interface with oxygen Bond et al. [7]. Combustion resistant alloys
are engineering alloys which, after being subjected to an ignition event, will not burn or exhibit 
combustion quenching behavior, resulting in minimal material consumption. Examples of engineering 
alloys, which are highly combustion resistant, are copper, pure nickel, and Monel. Depending upon
oxygen pressure, oxygen purity, temperature and configuration, other engineering alloys such as stainless 
steel may exhibit varying degrees of combustion resistance.
4.3 General Guidelines for Materials Selection 
The final selection of a material for an oxygen application is an optimized tradeoff between the 
chemical compatibility, the ignition and combustion characteristics, the physical properties of the 
material, the cost, and the consequences of a failure. Proper material choices can markedly reduce the 
probability of system ignition. Materials selected for cryogenic oxygen service shall have the required
structural ductility and notch sensitivity characteristics. References [1, 7-10, 22] provide detailed 
discussion on material selection.
4.4 Metals for Low-Pressure Oxygen Service 
Gaseous oxygen: Metals recommended for low-pressure (nominally less than 1000 psia) gaseous 
oxygen service include:
? Aluminum – nickel
? Aluminum alloys - nickel alloys
? Copper - stainless steel 
? Copper alloys.
Liquid oxygen: Metals recommended for service with liquid oxygen are:
? Nickel and nickel alloys
- Hastelloy B - nickel
- Inconel-X - Rene 41
- K-Monel
? Stainless steel types
- 304 - 310
- 304L – 316
- 304ELC - 321
? Copper and copper alloys
- Copper - Cupro-nickel
? Naval brass
? Admiralty brass.
A summary of recommended materials for oxygen system application is given in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Some Recommended Materials for Oxygen Servicea [7].
Application Low pressureb High pressurec
Component bodies Nickel alloy steel, Stainless steel Monel Inconel 718
Tubing and fittings Copper, Stainless steel, Steel, Aluminum
,Aluminum alloys
Monel Inconel 718
Internal parts Stainless steel Monel Inconel 718, Beryllium
copper
Springs Stainless steel Beryllium copper, Elgiloy, 
Monel
Valve seats Stainless steel Gold or silver plated over 
Monel or Inconel 718
Valve balls Stainless steel,, Tungsten carbide Sapphire
Lubricants Everlube 812, Microsel 100-1 and 200-1,
Triolube 1175, Krytox 240AB, and 240AC
Braycote 3L-38RP
Batch/lot-tested Braycote 3L-
38RP, Batch/lot- tested 
Everlube 812, Krytox 240AC
O-seals and backup TFE, Halon, TFE Teflon, Kel F, Viton Batch/lot-tested Viton 
Batch/lot-tested Teflon
Pressure vessels Nickel steel, Stainless steel, Steel, Aluminum
alloys
Inconel 718
a. This table lists materials for conservative design standards. Materials listed in the “Low pressure” column and other
materials that are not listed may be suitable for more extreme environment oxygen service. Careful engineering analysis
and rationale shall be used to select alternate materials.
b. Nominally less than 1000 psi.
c. Nominally greater than 1000 psi.
4.5 Prohibited Metals
Certain metals are prohibited from being used in oxygen systems [1]. Some of these are given below.
Cadmium: The toxicity and vapor pressure of cadmium restrict its use.
Titanium: Titanium metal shall not be used with liquid oxygen at any pressure or with gaseous 
oxygen or air at oxygen partial pressures above 30 psia. Titanium and its alloys are impact sensitive in 
oxygen.
Magnesium: Magnesium metal also should not be used in oxygen systems, and its alloys should only
be used in areas with minimal exposure to corrosive environments. Reactivity with halogenated
compounds constrains its use with lubricants containing chlorine and fluorine.
Mercury: Mercury must not be used in oxygen systems in any form because it is toxic. It and its 
compounds can cause accelerated stress cracking of aluminum and titanium alloys.
Beryllium: Beryllium, its oxides, and salts are highly toxic and therefore must not be used in oxygen 
systems or near oxygen systems where they could be consumed in a fire.
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4.6 Nonmetallic Materials
The primary concerns with using nonmetals in oxygen systems are their potential reaction with 
oxygen at the cryogenic temperatures. Their ignition temperatures are generally lower than those for 
metals, and their low thermal conductivity and heat capacity make them much easier to ignite. The
selection of these materials for use in oxygen is based on experience and testing of impact, ignition, and 
flammability characteristics. References [1 and 11] can provide more information on nonmetallic
materials. Nonmetals that have been used successfully are:
? Tetrafluoroethylene polymer (TFE, Halon TFE, Teflon, or equivalent)
? Unplasticized chlorotrifluoroethylene polymer (Kel F, Halon CTF, or equivalent)
? Fluoro-silicone rubbers and fluorocarbons (Viton®), batch-tested for acceptability (Viton® is a
registered trademark of Dupont Dow Elastomers)
? Lubricants such as Krytox (DuPont) and Triolube 16 (Aerospace Lubricants).
Table 2 contains a partial list of nonmetals and their applications.
4.7 Materials for High-Pressure Oxygen Service 
The materials listed in Table 2 have demonstrated superior resistance to ignition and fire propagation 
in high pressure, nominally greater than 1000 psi, oxygen systems.
4.8 Selecting Material by Configuration Testing 
If previously untested design material is proposed for a component, its suitability can be demonstrated
through configuration (an identical proposed hardware) testing at conditions more severe than the worst-
case environment for the component in question. The configuration tests should use oxygen pressures at 
least 10 percent above the worst-case condition. Expected temperature limits should be exceeded by at 
least 50° F. If the material is to be subjected to rapidly changing pressures, the pressure rise rate used in 
the configuration tests should be at least twice that which the component is expected to experience in 
operation. If cycling or multiple reuse of the component is a design requirement, the configuration testing 
should exceed by a factor of four the expected number of cycles or reuses. Failure of the configuration
test article before completion of the required number of cycles would limit the useful life of the 
component to one-fourth the number of cycles actually completed before failure.
4.9 Materials Tests
If a designer chooses a material that has not been previously approved or evaluated for oxygen
service, rationale, procedures, and data as presented in the references [9, 12], it shall be provided to the 
institutional Safety Committee for approval. 
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5. OPERATIONAL SAFETY AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
To operate an oxygen system safely, all potential ignition energy sources within oxygen systems must
be controlled by using appropriate and safe operational procedures. This section is based on the 
corresponding section in NASA Glenn Safety Manual [2].
5.1 Formal Procedures
All oxygen operations shall be conducted by knowledgeable and trained personnel using procedures
that are written and documented. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) with checklists shall be
developed for all the operations. The SOPs shall be prepared by individuals familiar with the work being
done and shall be reviewed and implemented by the appropriate authority and approved by the
institutional Safety Committee. Safety documentation should describe the operational safety, system
inspections, training, safety related communications, and prevention of hazards. Special procedures shall 
be developed to eliminate hazardous conditions when the system design and the use of safety equipment
alone are not enough to reduce a potential hazard to an acceptable level.
All operations involving the handling of oxygen shall be performed by at least two people (as a 
“buddy system”). Other safety measures are as follows:
? All operations involving oxygen shall be conducted by knowledgeable and trained personnel 
following formal written procedures
? Operators shall be certified as “qualified”
? Consideration for the safety of personnel at and near oxygen system must start in the earliest planning 
and design stages.
5.2 Training and “Qualified” Certification 
Operator training shall familiarize personnel with the nature of the facility's major process systems. 
Major systems include loading and storage systems; purge gas piping systems; control, sampling, and 
analyzing systems; alarm and warning signal systems; ventilation systems; and fire and personnel 
protection systems. Personnel who handle or use liquid and gaseous oxygen or who design equipment for 
oxygen systems must become familiar with its physical, chemical, and hazardous properties. In addition, 
the following requirements apply:
? Personnel must become familiar with materials compatibility of oxygen, cleanliness requirements, 
procedures for handling spills, and recognizing the system limitations and failures.
? Training should include instruction on how to use the protective equipment and clothing. Fire drills 
and safety meetings shall be held regularly. 
? Personnel must constantly reexamine procedures and equipment to be sure that safety has not been
compromised by changes in test methods, over-familiarity with the system, equipment deterioration, 
or mechanical stresses due to abnormal operating conditions. 
? Trained supervision of all potentially hazardous activities involving liquid oxygen is essential. 
Everyone working with these materials must abide with the first aid procedures described elsewhere 
in this document. Personnel shall be instructed to call 911 or other designated emergency phone
number) for all emergency aid.
Operators shall be certified as “qualified” for handling oxygen and “qualified” in the emergency
procedures for handling leaks and spills. “Qualified” operators should demonstrate:
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? Knowledge of the properties of liquid and gaseous oxygen
? Knowledge of approved materials that are compatible with liquid and gaseous oxygen under
operating conditions
? Knowledge of proper equipment and proficiency in its operation
? Familiarity with equipment operations 
? Proficiency in the use of protective equipment and clothing, and safety equipment
?  Knowledge of first aid and proper emergency actions
? Ability to maintain clean equipment and clean oxygen system
? Knowledge of normal operations and ability to recognize associated abnormalities.
5.3 Operating the Oxygen System 
Only authorized and “qualified” personnel shall operate the oxygen system after determining that the 
system is safe to operate. Personnel should be warned of combustible or explosive mixtures and high or 
low oxygen concentrations by detectors, sensors, and continuous sampling devices that operate both 
audible and visible alarms.
5.4 Guidelines for Oxygen Transfer 
In the high temperature electrolysis laboratory experiments, oxygen will not be transferred or 
transported to another location as one might expect in a commercial plant. Therefore, if laboratory
operation requires transportation of oxygen, following general guidelines should apply to both gaseous 
and liquid oxygen operations.
? Laboratory facility, transfer, and storage areas should be kept neat and free from combustibles and 
should be inspected frequently. An adequate water supply should be available for emergency fire 
fighting.
? The transfer equipment and its operation will be determined by local cognizant authority or the
equipment manufacturer. 
? Before starting transfer and flow operations, the oxygen system will be cleaned as required by the
safety procedures. 
? The oxygen system shall be periodically inspected for contamination and for elimination of unsafe
conditions.
? Introducing the once-used oxygen back into the supply line may contaminate the system. Venting 
once-used oxygen is a preferred procedure.
5.5 Oxygen System Maintenance or Repair 
The oxygen system shall be cleaned when it is opened for maintenance or repair. The following steps 
must be taken:
? Isolate, insofar as possible, the portion of the system to be cleaned and/or repaired.
? Drain, depressurize, and purge the oxygen system with an inert gas before opening it up.
? Leakage of contaminated air into the oxygen system must be avoided, especially if a part of the 
system is nitrogen jacketed. A slight positive pressure or purge may be necessary to avoid the system
from “breathing.”
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? Cap or seal any openings of a part prior to reinstalling it in the system.
? Purge and re-clean repaired parts prior to reinstallation in the system.
The oxygen system should be designed to avoid contaminant traps, which should be periodically 
cleaned. When working on equipment where oxygen enrichment is a possibility, isolate the equipment by
inserting a blank. A shutoff valve is not considered a positive means of isolation from a working oxygen
system.
5.6 Operational Procedures for Liquid Oxygen Systems
Specific operational check sheets shall be prepared by the design and operations team and approved
by the Safety Committees. The operations sheets shall include the following elements in the general
operating procedure for liquid system. High temperature electrolysis system at INL does not have liquid 
oxygen at any stage of the process. Therefore, this sub-section is for general information only.
Leak-check the system: Before operating a liquid oxygen system for the first time, cold-shock the
entire system with clean liquid nitrogen and then check for leaks. Before loading the system with liquid 
oxygen, purge the system of air and water vapor. Recheck for cleanliness to be sure that cold shocking 
and leak checking did not contaminate the system.
Loading: Fill the system with liquid oxygen gradually to limit “geysering,” severe local temperature
gradients, and surges in the system.
Operations: Do not proceed with testing until the system has reached thermal equilibrium.
Shutdown: Purge the oxygen residue from all components of the system.
Unloading and transfer leaks: Leaks are usually caused during loading and unloading by deformed
seals or gaskets, valve misalignment, or failures of flanges and equipment.
System leak repair: Relieve the system of any pressure, clean all the fittings and tools, making the 
system inert before performing any repairs or welding or brazing.
Condensation of contaminants during loading: Improper loading procedures for cryogenic oxygen
can result in condensation of water or any other condensable vapor inside the system. Before loading a 
cryogenic system, purge or evacuate from the system all air, water, and condensable vapors, because even 
contaminant levels of few parts per million can produce a sizable frozen mass that could impede flow or 
system function.
Sampling techniques: When required, collect samples of oxygen in a sealed container by following 
cleanliness and purging procedures to avoid contamination of the sample.
5.7 Disposal of Oxygen
Per Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 260 to 265, “Hazardous Waste Management,”
oxygen is not considered a hazardous waste. Uncontaminated liquid oxygen is best disposed of by
allowing it to vaporize from a normal heat leak into the container and letting the vapor escape through the 




Protective clothing and equipment shall be included in personnel protective measures.
Hand and foot protection: Gloves for work near cryogenic systems must be of good insulating
quality. They should be designed for quick removal if liquid oxygen gets inside. Cryogenic gloves do not
protect against immersion in liquid oxygen. They are limited to only providing insulation protection from
temperature extremes. Because of the danger of a cryogenic splash, shoes should have high tops and pant 
legs should be worn outside and over the shoe tops. Leather shoes are recommended.
Head, face, and body protection: Personnel handling liquid oxygen shall wear splash protection. A 
face shield or a hood with a face shield shall be worn. If liquid oxygen is being handled in an open
system, an apron of impermeable material should be worn. 
Impermeable clothing: Oxygen can saturate clothing, rendering it extremely flammable. Clothing 
described as flame resistant or flame retardant in air may be flammable in an oxygen-enriched 
atmosphere. Impermeable clothing with good insulating properties is effective in protecting the wearer 
from burns due to cryogenic splashes or spills, but even these components can absorb oxygen. 
Oxygen vapors on clothing: Any clothing that has been splashed or soaked with oxygen vapors shall 
be removed and unused until it is completely free of oxygen vapors.
Exposure to oxygen-rich atmospheres: Personnel exposed to high-oxygen atmospheres should 
leave the area and avoid all sources of ignition for at least 20 minutes, until the oxygen in their clothing 
dissipates. Removal of clothing should be considered.
Respiratory protection: Respiratory protection is not usually required in oxygen operations.
Storage of protective equipment: Facilities should be available near the oxygen use or storage area 
for the proper storage, repair, and decontamination of protective clothing and equipment. Safety and 
protective equipment shall be periodically inspected to ensure it is maintained in reliable condition at all 
times during use.
5.9 Smoking Regulations
? Smoking and open flames are prohibited within a minimum of 50 feet of an oxygen system.
? Persons who have been in an oxygen-enriched environment shall not smoke until they have been in a 
safe area for at least 20 minutes. Clothing saturated with oxygen vapor can be extremely hazardous.
5.10 Vapor Detection
High-oxygen-concentration detectors are not normally required.
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6. OXYGEN HANDLING AND STORAGE 
This section is based on NASA Safety Manual [2] and provides common-sense type summary of 
oxygen handling.
6.1 Oxygen Handling
All gauges, valves, regulators, piping, and equipment to be used in oxygen service must be cleaned 
for oxygen service. Never use an oxygen jet as compressed air for cleaning purposes, especially for 
cleaning clothing, as it increases the likelihood of an engulfing fire. Protect cylinders from physical
damage; do not drag, roll, slide, or drop. Instead, use a cart (trolley, hand truck, etc.) designed to transport 
cylinders. Do not allow storage area temperature to exceed 50°C (122°F). Read the product label before 
using the product and determine its properties and related hazards before using it. Do not remove or 
deface labels provided by the supplier for the identification of the cylinder contents. Leave valve 
protection caps in place until the container has been secured against either a wall or bench or placed in a 
container stand and is ready for use. Use an adjustable strap wrench to remove over-tight or rusted caps. 
Before connecting the container to the system, check the system suitability for pressure rating and 
material compatibility, and also ensure that there is no back flow from the system into the container. Test 
the oxygen system for leaks before use. Employ suitable pressure-regulating devices on all containers 
when oxygen gas is being released into a system with lower pressure rating than that of the container. 
Never insert an undesirable object (e.g., wrench, screwdriver, pry bar, etc.) into valve cap openings. 
Doing so may damage the valve, causing a leak to occur. Close container valves after each use and when 
empty, even if is still connected to the system. Never attempt to repair or modify container valves or 
safety relief devices. Damaged valves should be reported immediately to the supplier for replacement. Do 
not use containers for any purpose (as rollers or supports), other than to contain the gas as supplied. Never 
strike an arc on a compressed gas cylinder or make a cylinder a part of an electrical circuit. Do not smoke
while handling product or cylinders. Never re-compress a gas or a gas mixture without first consulting the
supplier. Never attempt to transfer gases from one cylinder/container to another. Always use a backflow 
protective device in piping. When returning cylinder, install valve outlet cap or plug leak tight. Never
permit oil, grease, or other readily combustible substances to come into contact with valves or containers 
containing oxygen or other oxidants. Do not use rapidly opening valves (e.g. ball valves). Open valve 
slowly to avoid pressure shock. Never pressurize the entire system at once. Use only with equipment 
cleaned for oxygen service and rated for cylinder pressure. Never use direct flame or electrical heating 
devices to raise the pressure of a container. Containers should not be subjected to temperatures above 
50°C (122°F). Prolonged periods of cold temperature below -30°C (-20°F) should be also avoided.
6.2 Oxygen Storage
Cylinders should be separated from any source of flame or any object that can combust by a 
minimum distance of 20 feet or by a barricade of noncombustible material at least 5 feet high, having a 
fire resistance rating of at least 1/2 hour. Containers should be stored in an area that is well ventilated, 
preferably in the open air. Full containers should be stored so that oldest stock is used first. Stored
containers should be periodically checked for general condition and leakage. Observe all regulations and 
local requirements regarding storage of containers. Protect containers stored in the open against rusting 
and extreme weather conditions. Containers should not be stored in conditions likely to encourage
corrosion. Containers should be stored in the vertical position and properly secured to prevent toppling.
The container should have tightly closed valves with caps or plugs. Suitable protection shall be provided
between oxygen storage containers and incompatible materials, plant equipment, buildings, test areas, and 
property lines so that any accidental or hazardous event has a minimum effect on the personnel and public 
safety. This protection may include separation by distance and by protective structures such as barricades
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or cell enclosures. Planning for protection and safety of personnel and equipment must start at the initial 
facility design stages.
6.3 Quantity-Distance Guidelines for Gaseous Oxygen Storage 
Quantity-distances for bulk gaseous oxygen storage facilities are intended to provide facility
protection from external fire exposure. A bulk oxygen system is an assembly of equipment, such as 
oxygen storage containers, pressure regulators, safety devices, vaporizers, manifolds, and interconnecting
piping, that has a storage capacity of more than 20,000 ft3 (566 m3) of oxygen, including unconnected
reserves at the site. The bulk oxygen system terminates at the point where oxygen at service pressure first 
enters the supply line. The oxygen containers may be stationary or movable.
Bulk oxygen storage systems shall be located either above ground and outdoors or shall be installed
in a building of fire-resistant construction that is adequately vented and is used exclusively for storing 
oxygen.
Containers and associated equipment should not be located beneath, or exposed to, the failure of 
electric power lines or piping containing any flammable liquid or gas.
6.4 Site and Equipment Design and Practice 
Structures: The storage facility (including support structures, roadways, drainage, etc.) should be 
made of fire-resistant materials and should be well ventilated. Normally, because of their special 
insulation, liquid oxygen storage tanks are not covered. If a storage facility requires protection, any open 
shed structure of fire-resistant materials may be used. 
Ventilation: Areas in which liquid oxygen is handled must always be well ventilated to prevent 
excessive concentration of the gas. The liquid must never be disposed of in confined areas or in places 
that others may enter. Gaseous oxygen will increase the intensity of any fire.
Grounding and lightning protection: Buildings, storage systems, and transfer facilities shall be
properly grounded against static electricity and should have approved lightning protection.
Housekeeping: Surrounding areas shall be kept free of grease, oil, oily waste, and all other organic 
materials (including vegetation). Smoking, sparks, and open flames are not permitted in storage areas.
Hazard warning: The bulk oxygen storage location shall be permanently placarded “OXYGEN - NO 
SMOKING - NO OPEN FLAMES.”
6.5 Electrical Wiring and Equipment 
Oxygen storage and test installations are not classified as hazardous locations as defined and covered
in Article 500 of NFPA 70, “National Electrical Code.” Therefore, general purpose or weatherproof types
of electrical wiring and equipment are acceptable, depending on whether the installation is indoor or
outdoor. Such equipment shall be installed in accordance with the applicable provisions of NFPA 70.
Instrumentation and signal conditioner circuitry installed in oxygen systems should be designed to 
minimize the overheating and arcing that might result from a sensor system short. Materials should be
chosen to minimize the chance of ignition should a short occur. In situations where arcing can occur, 




This section is based on Reference [2]. Safe use of oxygen requires the control of potential ignition 
energy mechanisms within oxygen systems by judiciously selecting system designs, “Standard Guide for 
Designing Systems for Oxygen Service” [14].
7.1 Safety Approval Policy
Before oxygen facilities, equipment, and systems are constructed, fabricated, and installed, the design 
shall be approved by the appropriate Safety Committee. The safety of systems for oxygen storage, 
handling, and use is enhanced when the facility plans, equipment designs, materials, and cleaning 
specifications are reviewed prior to construction.
7.2 Oxygen Design Supplements
Proven practical guidelines have been developed for the safe, successful design and use of oxygen 
gas. The following publications are valuable supplements to this chapter.
Mandatory: The “Standard Guide for Designing Systems for Oxygen,” [14] is an essential part of 
oxygen system design principles. This standard is adopted as part of this chapter on oxygen safety. The
designer/user is urged to obtain the latest revision of ASTM G88 [14]. The guide addresses system factors
by which ignition and fire can be avoided. It is also required to refer to ASTM MNL 36 [1] for further in-
depth guidelines.
Recommendations: The publication, “Design Guide for High Pressure Oxygen Systems” [7],
documents the critical and important detailed design data and provides a repository for such information,
along with significant data on oxygen reactivity phenomena with metallic and nonmetallic materials in
moderate to very high-pressure environments.
“Industrial Practices for Gaseous Oxygen Transmission and Distribution Piping System,”
Compressed Gas Association, CGA Pamphlet G4.4 [15].
7.3 Component Design
The designer is cautioned that, in addition to the standard analyses relating to component or system
function, certain additional special analyses are recommended for the proper design of oxygen systems
and must be considered in the design process. These analyses are listed by Bond et al. [7].
7.4 General System Considerations
The designer shall perform those standard analyses related to system flow capacity, dynamic and
static structural loads, thermally induced loads, heat transfer, and so forth. These routine analyses are not 
unique to high-pressure oxygen systems, but inadequate attention to them can result in system failures 
magnified by the extreme reactivity of oxygen.
The use of high-pressure oxygen requires certain design considerations that need special attention at 
the system level. The architecture, flow dynamics, thermal design, and cleanliness of the system are
important. Differences between cryogenic-liquid, super-critical, and gaseous oxygen systems must be 
considered. Details are provided in Chapter 5 of “Design Guide for High Pressure Oxygen Systems” by
Bond et al. [7].
21
7.5 System Flow Velocity
The primary source of concern under high velocity oxygen flow conditions is the entrainment of 
particulates and their subsequent impingement on a surface, such as at a pipe bend. The result can be 
system ignition. The following flow dynamics design practices are recommended to avoid oxygen system
fires [7, 11, 13]:
? If practical, avoid velocities that are nominally above 100 ft/s in gaseous oxygen and avoid cavitation 
in liquid oxygen. Where this is impractical, use the alternate materials recommended in the references
called out in Section 4 or those listed under the “High Pressure” column of Table 2 of this Section. 
? If possible, avoid the use of nonmetals at locations within a system where sonic flow or cavitation can 
occur.
? Maintain fluid system cleanliness and limit entrained particulates as specified in Section 8.
7.6 System Thermal Design
System thermal design considerations shall include thermal characteristics at startup, and avoiding the 
lockup of cryogenic oxygen in a system segment. It is necessary to bring components to thermal 
equilibrium before starting up cryogenic oxygen turbo pump systems and to avoid hazardous component
thermal transients which may affect clearances, cause rotor dynamic instabilities, or lead to high-speed 
friction. Any of these problems may result in ignition. Provision shall be made to provide thermal 
conditioning of the cryogenic system and components by gradually bleeding through cryogenic gas, then 
liquid. Cryogenic oxygen locked up between two valves or flow control components can absorb heat and, 
through the increase of pressure, cause structural failure. The system and components shall be designed to 
provide appropriate pressure relief.
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8. SYSTEM CLEANLINESS
Safe use of oxygen requires the control of potential ignition energy mechanisms within oxygen 
systems by maintaining scrupulously clean systems. Cleanliness (contamination control) is critical in 
oxygen components and systems. Contamination can cause ignition of components or systems of both
metallic and nonmetallic materials by a variety of mechanisms, such as particle, mechanical, or pneumatic
impact.
Designing for cleanliness is extremely important in oxygen systems. Metallic and nonmetallic
contaminants and nonvolatile residues may have been left in components and systems after fabrication
and assembly. Filters may need to be located throughout a system to control particulate contamination. 
Appropriate system flush and purge ports should be designed in the system at appropriate high and low 
points to allow effective flush or purge of the system.
8.1 General Policy
Before being placed in service, liquid and gaseous oxygen systems and components shall be 
completely cleaned. Since oxygen systems and components shall be periodically inspected to ensure that 
safety and component integrity are maintained during the life of the system, there are more opportunities
for contamination. If the oxygen system contains components with a history of in-service failures, 
appropriate traps or components shall be removed, inspected, and periodically replaced. Effective
cleaning will: 
? Remove particles, films, greases, oils, and other unwanted matter. All component parts shall be free 
of burrs, chips, scale, slag, or foreign matter and shall be cleaned prior to assembly.
? Prevent loose scale, rust, dirt, mill scale, weld spatter, and weld flux deposited on moving and 
stationary parts from interfering with the component function and clogging flow passages.
? Reduce the concentration of finely divided contaminants, which are more easily ignited than bulk 
material.
8.2 Oxygen Cleanliness References
The following publications contain proven, practical guidelines that were developed to safely and 
successfully control contamination in oxygen systems.
Mandatory: ASTM G93-88, “Standard Practice for Cleaning Methods for Materials and Equipment
Used in Oxygen-Enriched Environments,” [16] is an essential part of this oxygen system cleanliness
directive.
Recommendations: The following are highly recommended sources of information for oxygen
system cleanliness:
? CGA Pamphlet G-4.1, “Cleaning Equipment for Oxygen Service” [17].
? Bond et al. [7], Chapters 6 to 8.
? ASRDI Oxygen Technology Survey, Volume 2, “Cleaning Requirements, Procedures, and 
Verification Techniques” [18].
? “Cleanliness of Components for Use in Oxygen, Fuel, and Pneumatic Systems,” Manned Space Flight 
Center, MSFC Spec 164B, November 1994, (contains acceptable methods of cleaning pipe, tubing,
and flexible hose).
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? “Specifications for Surface Cleanliness of Fluid Systems,” Kennedy Space Center, KSC-C-123H,
1995.
8.3 Cleaning Procedures
Cleaning methods and subsequent inspections must produce the degree of cleanliness required for the 
safe operation of oxygen service equipment and the necessary purity required for experimental test 
operations. Cleaning a component or system for oxygen service involves the removal of combustible
contaminants, including the surface residue from manufacturing, hot work, and assembly operations, as 
well as the removal of all cleaning agents. These cleaning agents and contaminants include solvents, 
acids, alkalis, water, moisture, corrosion products, non-compatible thread lubricants, filings, dirt, scale, 
slag, weld splatter, organic material (such as oil, grease, crayon, and paint), lint, and other foreign 
materials. Injurious contaminants can be removed by cleaning all parts and maintaining this condition
during construction, by completely cleaning the system after construction, or by a combination of the two.
The prevention of recontamination before final assembly, installation, and use is essential to safe oxygen 
system operation.
Responsibility: The organization performing the cleaning service shall have the responsibility of 
developing detailed cleaning procedures. The oxygen systems cleanliness acceptability shall be based 
only on the quality specifications of the cleaning end result and not on the cleaning procedures used.
Cleaning procedure safety: The organization performing the cleaning services shall have 
responsibility for all safety aspects of oxygen cleaning procedures.
Special considerations: Components that could be damaged during cleaning should be removed and 
cleaned separately. Cleaning or disassembly operations that might affect tolerances or impair calibration
of precision components should be performed only under the supervision of personnel qualified in the 
handling, calibration, and assembly of the components. The cleaning procedures established for each 
system or component shall be compatible with the design configurations. Prior to use, establish the 
compatibility of cleaning agents with all construction materials, making sure that time or temperature
constraints are not exceeded.
8.4 Verification of Oxygen System Cleanliness 
A key element of the contaminant control safety plan is the final inspection and verification of system
cleanliness by using an approved acceptance specification. Experience has shown that approximately one-
half of all parts cleaned fail on the initial sampling to meet either the particulate or the nonvolatile residue 
specification. Should this occur, repeated cleaning is required until all parts pass both specifications [7].
Inspection procedures: Inspection shall be followed to verify cleanliness of components and 
systems for oxygen service.
Cleanliness acceptance criteria: Acceptance criteria for all systems and components are based on 
KSC-C-123H, “Surface Cleanliness of Fluid Systems” [19]. The acceptance level shall be 300-A. This 
represents a particle limit and a hydrocarbon limit identical to those which Kennedy Space Center [19]
uses on ground equipment in oxygen service.
8.5 Recommendations for Re-Inspection 
Oxygen components and systems shall be re-inspected periodically to ensure that safety and 
component integrity is maintained during the life of the system. Determination of system and component
re-inspection intervals has proven to be a complex task. Detailed knowledge of construction materials, 
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pressure levels, the use environment, and the service the system is performing must be applied. A record 
of re-inspections must be kept on file and labels placed on the inspected components. In establishing the 
re-inspection intervals, the following items should be considered:
? Routine disassembly and reassembly of oxygen piping systems invariably increases the level of
contamination in the system because particulates are generated. 
? Sampling of an assembled system for gas-borne contaminants yields only limited data on the internal 
cleanliness. This method of system sampling cannot be directly correlated with the cleanliness of 
internal system surfaces.
? The re-inspection plan must address the design service life of components.
? Additional insight regarding system contamination levels can be gained through systematic inspection 
of components (e.g., transducers, flexible hoses, relief valves, filters) removed for calibration, proof-
testing, or periodic maintenance.
? Cleanliness levels in components and systems that have been in service shall be re-verified to make 
sure that the Cleanliness Acceptable Criteria are met.
? Reassembly procedures shall adhere to guidelines for original assembly, including assembly
checkout.
Assembly of systems: After system and component disassembly and cleaning, reassembly of 
components and systems must be stringently controlled to ensure that the cleanliness criteria are met. All 
components requiring reassembly (e.g., valves, regulators, and filters) should be reassembled in a filtered-
air environment such as a clean room. Personnel should be properly attired in clean-room garments and 
gloves. All tools that contact component internal parts must be cleaned previously to the specified levels.
Final system checkout: After the system has been reassembled, a final pressure integrity and leak
test should be performed with an appropriately filtered inert gas that has been analyzed for contaminants.
Hydrostatic tests: It is not recommended that hydrostatic tests be performed on cleaned systems,
since this is likely to contaminate them. Conduct these tests on the components before cleaning and final 
assembly.
Cryogenic cold-shock: Cold-shocking a newly assembled liquid oxygen system by loading it with
clean liquid nitrogen following final assembly is highly recommended. After the cryogenic cold-shock, 
the system should be emptied of liquid nitrogen and warmed to ambient temperature. Bolts and threaded 
connections must then be re-torqued to prescribed values, and gas leak-checking procedures should 
follow. The entire system should be inspected for evidence of cracking, distortion, or any other anomaly,
with special attention directed to welds. Then system cleanliness must be checked and verified.
Final operational tests: Final operational tests should be run with oxygen (liquid or gas, as required 
by the system) at rated pressure. If it is possible to substitute nitrogen for this test, this should be done for 
greater safety in the operational test. Only verified clean, dry nitrogen shall be used for these tests. It is 
prudent to recheck the system filters for cleanliness after the test is completed. It is a good practice to 
perform the first oxygen pressurization of a system by remote control, since assembly-generated
contaminants can cause ignition.
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9. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 
9.1 Emergency Action
In case of an emergency, institutional procedures should be followed. As a generic understanding of
the emergency procedures, the following actions shall be followed [2]:
? Direct all personnel to evacuate the suspected hazardous area. Activate building evacuation alarms.
? Call the Emergency Dispatcher by dialing 911 or other designated emergency phone number.
? Isolate or shut off all oxygen supply sources. 
? Attempt to control the emergency with the installed facility system safety equipment and preplanned 
procedures.
9.2 Oxygen Leaks and Spills 
The quantity of oxygen that might leak from a system may range from extremely low up to an 
emergency situation. Leaks can occur from O-rings connections, the valve packing, or from the oxygen
supply tubes used. There are three main types of leaks. 
? Non-detectable leaks - This type of leak is normally not detectable (no hissing sound). These leaks 
may be the result of a failure in the O-ring or other connections.
? Slow leak (detectable by sound) - Slow leaks are detectable by sound. This quantity of oxygen being 
released poses minimal hazard to the workers. However, when detected, immediate emergency action 
is needed.
? Catastrophic leakage (broken valve or coupling) - Should massive quantities of oxygen be released, 
the enriched atmosphere of oxygen can greatly enhance a fire. If this event occurs, immediately call 
emergency services for appropriate action.
A general fire hazard for the nearby equipment always exists when a major oxygen leak occurs. 
However, with proper system design, material selection, operating procedures, and adequate ventilation, 
the hazard can be minimized. Oxygen vapor cloud may persist for a considerable distance downwind of a 
large liquid oxygen spill.
9.3 Rescue 
Only personnel trained in specific emergency procedure shall engage in rescue activities. All other 
personnel shall stay clear of an emergency area. Rescue personnel should deluge a burning victim with
water and move him/her to fresh air as soon as possible. Fire blankets should not cover a person saturated 
with oxygen, as it will prevent oxygen from dissipating from the clothing. Blankets can also become
oxygen saturated, thus becoming a fire hazard.
9.4 Firefighting/Fire Control
Only personnel trained in specific firefighting techniques should engage in the firefighting. All other 
personnel should stay clear of the area. The following general recommendations are to be used as a guide 
for controlling fire.
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Liquid oxygen and fuel: When the fire involves liquid oxygen and liquid fuels, control it as follows:
? If fuel and liquid oxygen are mixed but not burning, quickly evacuate personnel, isolate the area from
sources of ignition, and allow the oxygen to evaporate. Mixtures of fuel and liquid oxygen present an 
extreme explosion hazard.
? If a liquid oxygen/fuel fire occurs, shut off fuel and oxygen supplies. Only water sprays or fog should 
be used to cool the fire. Foams should not be applied. The foam will retard oxygen evaporation and 
will not extinguish the fire. 
9.5 Transportation Emergencies
Hazards caused by damage to oxygen transportation systems (road, rail, air, and water) include spills 
and leaks. Such spills may result in fires and explosions. However, such situations are not applicable to 
INL laboratory experiments. 
9.6 Decontamination of Oxygen and Fuel Mixtures Liquid 
If there is an oxygen spill/leak, in due course of time, oxygen will eventually evaporate from
contaminated surfaces. When liquid oxygen has been contaminated by fuel, isolate the area from sources
of ignition and quickly evacuate personnel. Allow the oxygen to evaporate and the residual fuel to reach 
ambient temperatures. Purge the oxygen system with gaseous nitrogen prior to any other cleanup step.
9.7 First Aid
Dial 911 (or other emergency designated phone number). Contact with liquid oxygen or its cold boil-
off vapors can produce cryogenic burns (frostbite). Therefore, unprotected parts of the body should not be
allowed to contact non-insulated pipes or vessels containing cryogenic fluids. The cold metal will cause 
the flesh to stick and tear. Treatment of truly frozen tissue requires professional medical supervision since 
incorrect first aid practices almost always aggravate the injury.
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10. PROPERTIES OF OXYGEN
10.1 Physical Properties
Oxygen is an element which, at atmospheric temperatures and pressures, exists as a colorless, 
odorless, and tasteless gas. High purity liquid oxygen is a light blue, transparent liquid. It is an extremely
cold cryogenic fluid, which makes handling it potentially hazardous. It boils at -297° F (90° K) at
atmospheric pressure. It boils vigorously in ambient conditions. Table 3 provides more information on the
physical properties of oxygen.
10.2 Chemical Properties
Solubility: Most common solvents are solid at liquid oxygen temperatures. Liquid oxygen is
completely miscible with liquid nitrogen and liquid methane. Light hydrocarbons are usually soluble in
liquid oxygen and such mixtures are very hazardous.
Reactivity: In either gaseous or liquid form, oxygen is a strong oxidizer that vigorously supports
combustion.
A material’s rate of reaction with oxygen depends on the conditions of its exposure to oxygen and its 
physical and chemical properties. A particular material may react with oxygen.
Table 3. Selected Safety-Relevant Physical Properties of Gaseous and Liquid Oxygen [21, 1].
Gaseous Oxygen
Reference temperature 68°F, (293.15 K)
Standard pressure (1 atm) 14.69 psia, (101.325 kPa)
Density 0.0831 lb/ft3, (1.33 kg/m3)
Specific volume 12.03 ft3/lb, (0.751 m3/kg)
Specific heat at constant pressure, Cp 0.220 Btu/(lb·F), (0.919 J/g·C)
Specific heat at constant volume, Cv 0.157 Btu/(lb·F), (0.68919 J/g·C)
Velocity of sound 1070 ft/s, (326 m/s)
Critical density 27.2 lb/ft3, (436.1 kg/m3)
Critical pressure 731.4 psia, (5043 kPa)
Critical temperature, -181.43°F, (154.6 K)
Liquid Oxygen
268.6 R 588 psia (4052.0 kPa)
259 R 441 psia (3039.0 kPa)
240 R 294 psia (2026.5 kPa)
216 R 147 psia (1013.2 kPa)
196 R 73.5 psia (506.60 kPa) 
195 R 29.4 psia (202.64 kPa)
Vapor pressure at selected temperatures
162 R 14.7 psia (101.32 kPa)
Boiling point at 1 atm, -297.3°F (90.18 K)
Density 71.23 lb/ft3, (1141 kg/m3)
Specific heat at constant pressure, Cp 0.221 Btu/(lb·F), (0.93 J/g·C)
Specific heat at constant volume, Cv 0.284 Btu/(lb·F), (1.16 J/g·C)
Velocity of sound 2963 ft/s, (90.3 m/s)
Heat of vaporization 91.59 Btu/lb, (213 J/g)
Heat of fusion at triple point 5.98 Btu/lb (13.9 J/g)
Triple point temperature -361.8°F (54.35 K)
Triple point pressure 0.022 psia (0.152 kPa)
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11. SAFETY COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES AND A PAST ACCIDENT 
INL has either completed or initiated activities related to safe handling of oxygen systems. Some of 
these are described below. 
11.1 Oxygen Monitors
INL has completed a study (attached in Appendix A) to assess the need for monitors for the presence
of combustible and toxic (oxygen) gas in the laboratory. This study discusses the type of monitors to be 
installed, locations where these should be installed, and the kind of data that can be expected from these 
monitors. At present, a suitable number of oxygen sensors have been installed in the laboratory.
11.2 Laboratory Hazard Review
Before performing any experiments in the laboratory, the INL Safety Committee conducts a 
Laboratory Instruction (LI) Review of the hydrogen/oxygen generating system in a laboratory designated 
as “REC 670-BCTC Bay 9.” The Safety Committee examines the experimental process, health and safety
issues related to the experimental procedure, and the instrumentation available to conduct the experiment 
and monitor any hazards. The Safety Committee examined a document (attached in Appendix B) and has 
granted permission to proceed with the experiment. In view of the extensive material contained in the 
present report, a few more reviews may be performed if required by the experimental conditions. The 
exact determination will be made soon. 
11.3 Canadian AEC Chalk River Accident Report 
The INL has collaborated with Atomic Energy of Canada, Chalk River and has exchanged 
information periodically on hydrogen generation. As a result of this interaction and also as a part of 
information review on oxygen handling, INL obtained a report on an accident [21]. The following is a 
summary of that accident and investigative report, which can provide useful information for future safe 
handling of oxygen.
An accident occurred on May 4, 2006, in Room 241 of Building 250 at the Atomic Energy of Canada
Chalk River Facility [21]. The incident occurred on a newly fabricated gas distribution panel for a 
recombiner test rig. The operator indicated that he/she had opened the cylinder valves on the gas supply
manifold at about 8 AM (~5.5 hours before the incident). The operator further indicated that the pressure 
on supply manifold pressure gauges (PI-35 and PI-36) read approximately 2300 psig. At 1:25 PM, he/she 
opened isolation valve (V-104) to pressure regulator (PCV-23) in Room 241 without incident. The
operator then opened isolation valve (V-105) to pressure regulator (PCV-16) in Room 241) and fire
immediately erupted from the pressure gauges attached to PCV-16. The operator indicated that he/she 
heard a “pop” or “tap” and then saw two 3 to 4 foot flames erupt in a “V” pattern from the gauges while 
he/she exited the room. The operator indicated that he/she rushed downstairs to the supply manifold and
shut all oxygen supply valves, then all nitrogen and hydrogen supply valves to Room 241. The operator 
believes the gauge cover from one of the pressure gauges impacted his/her arm as it was ejected from the 
gauge. This incident was investigated by Wendell Hill & Associates and following conclusions were 
drawn [21].
The regulator PCV-23 was not damaged internally during the incident even though it was pressurized 
with oxygen immediately prior to PCV-16 and was closely positioned to PCV-16. However, PCV-23 
exhibited a large amount of white grease-like residue in all ports (Figures 4 and 5), including the 
inlet/outlet ports and the gauge ports. Visual examination of this residue also revealed a brown, grease-
like, substance within the whitish residue. The residue samples were analyzed to determine that this 
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material contained PTFE (Teflon). PTFE is widely considered oxygen compatible, but also contained
both polyethylene and polyester based compounds, which are considered to exhibit poor compatibility
with oxygen. It was determined that a Loctite sealant with Teflon and a Loctite primer were used during 
the installation. 
Autogenous Ignition Temperature (AIT) in high pressure oxygen. The AIT of the Loctite primer and 
the sealant were determined to be ~163°C and ~193°C, respectively. By comparison, PTFE materials 
generally have AIT in the range 434 to 450°C. These data, shown in Table 4, provide a means of 
evaluating whether a material is capable of promoting other flammable materials during an oxygen fire. 








Loctite Primer 7649 163 6,280 --
Loctite Sealer 567 194 6,643 --
Nylon 6/6 178-270 7,400-7,900 23.9-36
Buna-N (Nitrile rubber) 173 8,500 22
Polyethelene (PE) 176-220 11,150 17.5
Propylene (generic) 174 11,000 18
PVC 239 4,990 32-38
Silicone Rubber 275 3,600 21-32
Polycarbonate (generic) 310 7,600-9,400 27.4
Viton (FKM) 300-325 3,000-5,000 56-100
Teflon (PTFE) 427+ 1,000-1,700 95-100
The data in Table 4 show that different materials exhibit vastly different oxygen compatibility. The 
oxygen compatibility for materials is defined by ASTM standards to be the “ability of a substance to 
coexist with both oxygen and a potential source(s) of ignition at an expected pressure and temperature
with a magnitude of risk acceptable to the user.” Generally, preferred nonmetals have a high auto-ignition
temperature, AIT (i.e., they resist ignition until higher temperatures), low heat of combustion, ?Hc (i.e., 
they have low damage potential), and high oxygen indices, OI (i.e., a high concentration of oxygen is 
required before they become flammable at ambient pressure). The most oxygen compatible elastomer and 
plastic for oxygen applications are considered to be Viton and Teflon, respectively based on their AIT, 
?Hc, and OI values. 
PCV-16, (Figure 5) the fire-damaged regulator, was examined to trace the internal melt/flow patterns. 
Previous experience indicates that “fire follows flow” for components and materials consistent with the 
Chalk River installation. Thus, the internal burn patterns provide evidence pertaining to the origin site and 
kindling chain associated with the incident. The burn patterns associated with PCV-16 indicated that 
extensive burning developed from the extreme inlet to the regulator, at the inlet port to the extreme outlet 
of the regulator (Figure 5). The inlet screen filter was estimated to be approximately 80% consumed. The 
high-pressure regulating valve assembly spring, poppet, and seat retainer were completely consumed. The 
outlet port was heavily damaged by fire and a significant degree of consumption of the brass body was 
observed at the outlet port. Since brass is generally nonflammable under the service conditions of the 
Chalk River incident, the burning at the outlet was consistent with a concentration of burning from other 
flammable materials swept by the flow toward the downstream valve. This containment of pressure and 
burning in the downstream port would be expected to greatly increase the combustion kinetics and
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establish conditions for a pressure blow-out. This highly energetic internal burning and pressure blowout 
is demonstrated by the extensive burning of the regulators outlet, the apparent consumption/damage of 
needle valve, V-62 (since it was never identified in the post-incident debris), and the damage observed on 
the T-junction downstream of V- 62. 
The combustion observed within PCV-16 was consistent with a kindling chain event that kindled 
materials inside the regulator from its inlet to its outlet. The most probable kindling chain was associated
with burning of the grease-like (Loctite) residue that was observed in PCV-23 and also used during the 
assembly and installation of PCV-16. The testing indicated that it would have ignited at a relatively low 
temperature and delivered sufficient energy to kindle the stainless steel filter screen and valve assembly
(spring, poppet, seat/retainer). Once these metallic elements ignited, then significant propagation and 
energy release would be expected and self-sustained combustion would have ensued. However, since the 
internal combustion patterns extended upstream of PCV-16, it was not considered consistent with the 
origin of the fire. Generally speaking, for high-pressure oxygen fires associated with the materials
involved in this incident, the fire’s origin is usually associated with the most upstream
component/element that exhibits burning.
The Whitey valve (V-105) was a “ball valve”, which includes an “interstage” (inside the ball element)
that would have been at ambient pressure prior to it being rotated open. When the interstage of a ball 
valve pressurizes rapidly, adiabatic compression heating develops momentarily in the interstage while the 
flow rate establishes critical conditions at the downstream seat of the valve. This rapid pressurization of 
the interstage is an adiabatic compression event that delivers its energy in the interstage of the valve. 
Normally, the PTFE downstream seat of the valve would not be considered vulnerable to ignition by this 
mechanism since the thermal energy develops inside the ball’s interstage (metallic element); however, if 
contamination were present in the interstage, then ignition would be considered likely. Since each of these 
three heat sources would occur simultaneously when the valve was being opened, and since the physical
evidence indicates ignition at the upstream seat and interstage of the valve, the ignition mechanism(s)
associated with the fire in question was probably a combination of those indicated above (i.e., mechanical
friction, flow friction, and adiabatic compression in the valve’s interstage). Evidence was observed of fire 
propagation completely through the regulator, PCV-16, and into the downstream tubing. The needle valve 
downstream, V-62, is understood to have never been recovered and was probably ejected under pressure 
while combustion intensified at the regulators downstream port. Based on the heavy grease-like residue 
observed in all ports of PCV-23, it is considered likely that this residue was present in PCV-16 and 
promoted from the ignition at V-105. Since this residue exhibited a very low auto-ignition temperature
(AIT) consistent with hydrocarbon-based grease, its heat of combustion would be expected to kindle the 
stainless steel elements of the regulator. The burning of these metallic elements would have greatly
intensified the overall energy release from the regulator. The intense burning of PCV-16 and the fire’s
propagation from inlet to outlet, including the pressure gauges, is considered to have been largely
influenced by this Loctite sealant, which should be considered highly incompatible with oxygen.
31
Figure 4. AEC’s PCV-23, showing ports after the accident. 
Figure 5. “White” contamination at the PCV-23 ports.
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Figure 6. PCV-16 valve showing heavy combustion damage at the outlet port (shown lower).
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Figure 7. V-105 “ball” valve showing damage by fire. 
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Monitoring for Combustible 
and Toxic Gases 
L. Cadwallader, December 2006 
Some questions have arisen on what are the best, most safety conservative, practices for stationary, ‘fixed
point’ gas monitors that would be used for sensing flammable, toxic, or oxygen-displacing gases, or 
elevated oxygen concentrations in room air. This EDF presents data on monitors and design practices to
answer these questions.  The EDF is divided into four parts: monitor selection for indoor applications, 
monitor setpoints, monitor placement in rooms, and a few system usage notes. 
For clarity, the National Electrical Code (NFPA 70), which is adopted by the US DOE (DOE, 1998), in
Article 500-7 (K) “Combustible Gas Detection System” states: 
A combustible gas detection system shall be permitted as a means of protection in industrial 
establishments with restricted public access and where the conditions of maintenance and supervision 
ensure that only qualified persons service the installation.  Gas detection equipment shall be listed for 
detection of the specific gas or vapor to be encountered.  Where such a system is installed, equipment
specified in 500.7(K)(1), (K)(2), or (K)(3) shall be permitted.  The type of detection equipment, its listing,
installation locations(s), alarm and shutdown criteria, and calibration frequency shall be documented 
when combustible gas detectors are used as a protection technique.  NFPA 70 also recommends following 
ISA-RP12.13.02, Installation, Operation, and Maintenance of Combustible Gas Detection Instruments
(ANSI, 2003).
The ISA-RP12.13.02 (ANSI, 2003), section 6.2.1, states:
A fixed gas detection system should be installed that is capable of monitoring those parts of a plant or 
other premises where flammable gas(es) accidentally accumulate and may create significant hazard.  The
system should be capable of giving an early audible or visual (or both) warning of both the presence and 
the general location of an accident accumulation of flammable gas(es), in order to initiate one or more of 
the following actions, either automatically or under manual control: 
a) safe evacuation of premises
b) appropriate fire-fighting procedures
c) shutdown of process or plant
d) ventilation control 
1.  Monitor Selection.
The initial step in monitor selection is to define the gases to be sensed.  This includes listing all gases to
be used in the room or facility: process gases, maintenance or cleaning gases, welding gases, background 
gases, and product gases.  Table 1 gives some basic data on a number of gases – the list of gases found in 
the lab or facility should be completed to this level of detail.  With the gases defined, then the type of
monitor to sense those gases can be selected.  Chou (2000) has reviewed all of the major types of gas 
monitors, including their operating temperature ranges, response times, accuracies, repeatabilities, drift in 
settings, and life expectancies.  Table 2 below gives some highlights from Chou’s work.  There are a few 
other parameters to review in the course of selecting a monitor.  Temperature range in which the monitor
must function, monitor power demand, and humidity expected in the location are all important to monitor
functionality.
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From these steps, with the types of gases and knowledge of the types of detectors available, it should be
reasonably straightforward to select a monitor for the gases.  Chou pointed out that the background gases
are very important, since some types of gas detectors will be hampered by background gases and produce 
false readings due to the background gases.  There are many detector brands available for the designer to
choose from.  The Thomas Register (www.thomasnet.com) lists many brands, including one of the most
well known gas sampling companies, Dräger.
Chou (2000) also stated that gas monitors tend to be placed in two broad categories, toxic gas monitoring
or combustible range monitoring.  In general, toxic gas monitors are measuring concentrations for human
health.  They measure in a range up to 3 to 5 times above the permissible exposure limits, usually in tens 
of volume parts per million (ppm).  Combustible range monitoring is generally up to 100% of the lower 
flammable limit (LFL), or a fraction of that, such as 50% LFL.  Such levels tend to be in the several 
percent of the atmosphere range, where 1% = 10,000 ppm.
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O2 oxidizer toxic n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Notes:  LDL and UDL mean lower detonation limit and upper detonation limit in air. 
Some sources give the vapor density of a gas at STP, based on dry air vapor density=1, so values > 1 are 
heavier than air and vice versa. Using the gas MW in g/mole and 22.4 l/mole volume at STP is also
effective to determine which gas is lighter or heavier than air. 
Data sources for Table 1: 
NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, NIOSH pub no. 2005-149, 2005.
Matheson Gas Data Book, seventh edition, McGraw Hill, New York, 2001, appendix 19. 
W. E. Baker and M. J. Tang, Gas, Dust and Hybrid Explosions, Elsevier, 1991.
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Temperature sensitive, can misread 
by 0.5 to 1% per ºC away from
calibration temperature.  Humidity
does not affect the sensor.
Measures ppm ranges, well suited 
for toxic gas sensing.  About 20












Used for over 50 years, for dozens
of combustible gases. Note that
the catalyst can be poisoned by
other gases or particulates in the










when used in 
clean
applications
Used for more than 120 gases.
Susceptible to background gases
giving false alarms.  Absorptive
filters reduce background gas false 















High sensitivity, from a few ppm
to 100% concentration, suitable for
toxic and combustible gases.  Does
not react well to sudden temper-
ature variations in the room.  Not
corroded or reacted by gas.  The












for the UV 
lamp
Almost always used for detecting
volatile organic compounds
(VOCs)
Toxic gases – Electrochemical and solid-state sensors are the most widely used
Combustible gases – Catalytic bead, solid-state, and infrared sensors are the most widely used
Data presented in this table are from Chou (2000).  Mr. Chou is the President of International Sensor
Technology, Inc., Irvine, California.
Table 2 gives some information on numbers of gases that can be monitored by different types of gas monitors or
sensors.  Warren (1997) gave a list of over 380 commonly used industrial gases found in the chemical industry as
well as in manufacturing, munitions, semiconductor fabrication, and other industries.  Vendor literature will 
describe which sensors are sold to monitor specific gases.
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2.  Monitor Setpoints
The INL safety manual section on compressed gases (INL, 2005) has adopted best practices 
in gas handling and use from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 
29CFR1910, the Compressed Gas Association, and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
standards 45, 51, and 55.  With the list of all gases to be used or created in the laboratory and 
their expected volumes, the designer can check several documents to verify gas toxicity, i.e., any 
toxic chemical effects and the oxygen displacement (called a simple asphyxiant) or chemical
asphyxia hazard (where a gas, such as CO, chemically displaces oxygen from the blood) and the
flammability or explosibility of each gas to generate data similar to those shown in Table 1.  One 
document that can give such information for a wide variety of gases is the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Pocket Guide to Hazardous Chemicals (NPG, 2005), 
which is available as a downloadable pdf from the NIOSH web site (www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/).
Other documents include Kuchta (2000), Zabetakis (2005), and Patnaik (1999).  With the
toxicity and flammability known, monitor setpoints can be chosen.  A word of interpretation 
here, some gases can have a lower flammable limit (LFL), the lean limit, of some specific
volume percentage in air, and span a large volume concentration range until the gas is too rich to 
burn in air (the upper flammable limit, UFL).  The flammable limits and explosive limit are used 
interchangeably, since a deflagration in air is considered to be an explosion (Crowl, 2003; 
Bjerketvedt, 1997; Drysdale, 1985).  Some gases can also have a highly explosive range in air 
within the flammable range, that is, detonation limits.  Flammable means the gas can burn in a
flash fire with almost no overpressure or can deflagrate (that is, combust via a subsonic 
combustion wave, rather than a supersonic detonation wave front) in air.  A deflagration can be 
quite destructive itself without having a gas-air detonation event.  The lower explosive limit is
synonymous with the lower flammable limit because a flash fire or a deflagration (with just a 
few psi to up to ~8 atmospheres of overpressure) can be destructive; most buildings or confined 
spaces cannot withstand more than a few psi of overpressure, and humans themselves cannot 
stand more than a few atmospheres of overpressure without severe lung and gastrointestinal 
damage (AIChE, 1994).  Gas detonation in air means a supersonic combustion wave and higher 
overpressures than deflagrations (up to ~14 atmospheres, Baker 1991); detonations are usually
highly destructive but require high energy sources (~kJ) to initiate rather than the milliJoule
sparks that can ignite deflagrations.  Most gases have a wide flammable range and a smaller
detonation range, like shown in Table 1.  For example, hydrogen has a 4% to 74% volume
mixture in air as its flammable range, and a smaller detonation range (18 to 59%).  Using LFL is 
safety conservative due to the damage created by a simple deflagration in air, and the fact that a 
detonation in air requires a higher gas concentration and a high energy ignition source, so 
detonations will be more rare events than flash fires or deflagrations. Whenever a standard or
rule states the LEL, it is taken to mean the LFL, the lower deflagration limit.
NFPA Standard 55 states that a gas detection system shall alert persons on-site and a responsible person
off-site when the gas concentration in the storage / use area reaches the US Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL), OSHA ceiling limit (CL) for exposure 
or short term exposure limit (STEL) for the gas employed.  Gas detection systems shall have a sensing 
interval not exceeding 5 minutes and provide a local alarm.  The gas detection system shall monitor the 
exhaust system at the point of discharge from the gas cabinet, exhausted enclosure, or gas room.  For
gases used in unattended operation, an automatic valve shall close if the concentration of the gas reaches
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one-half of the Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) value for that gas.  IDLH values are
listed by NIOSH in their Pocket Guide to Hazardous Chemicals (NPG, 2005). 
The US Department of Energy (DOE) has stated in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR, 2006) and in
its directive on worker safety (DOE, 1998) that when American Conference of Governmental Industrial 
Hygienists (ACGIH) Threshold Limit Values (TLVs) of respirable substances in air are lower (that is,
more protective) than OSHA values, ACGIH values will be used.  Even with that deviation from the law,
contractors must still comply with other provisions cited in OSHA 29CFR1910.  Table 3 gives values for
some representative gases.  In the case of carbon monoxide, using the more protective ACGIH value of 
25 ppm as a toxic gas monitor alarm setpoint should be adopted for a laboratory room with carbon
monoxide present.  The values for carbon dioxide are in agreement across organizations, so the OSHA 
PEL value of 5,000 ppm can be used for the alarm setpoint.  In discussions with INL Environment, Safety
and Health (ESH) personnel over the safety of a new National Hydrogen Initiative experiment being
constructed in the Bonneville County Technology Center (BCTC) bay 9, the ESH personnel indicated that 
they desired using 50% of the TLV as a warning alarm setpoint for gases that have listed TLVs.  Using 
50% of the TLV as a warning alarm point is an INL-specific practice based on the DOE directive on 
worker safety (DOE, 1998) – it is driven by Battelle Energy Alliance requirements that are more
conservative than the directions given in NFPA Standard 55.  The 50% TLV warning alarm was 
discussed during Independent Hazard Review meetings for the National Hydrogen Initiative experiments 
being placed into BCTC Bay 9. 
The experimenters in BCTC Bay 9 questioned if it was possible to remain in the room to perform
mitigation activities once the TLV value was reached, since the TLV is a level of exposure that can be
tolerated by a nominally healthy worker for a typical 2,000 hour work year without harm.  There is some
latitude in the peak exposure to some gases that could allow for some extra time.  As mentioned above, 
there are CL and STEL values for some gases, so rare exposures to greater than the TLV are possible; and 
the US DOE has also developed Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits (TEELs) (DOE, 2005).  While 
these TEEL limits were developed for the general public (groups of persons that include the young and 
elderly, as well as infirm and healthy adults), they can also apply to staff if found allowable by ESH and
management.  However, with INL-specific requirements of a warning alarm at 50% TLV and evacuation 
at 100% TLV values, the TEELs are not used.  The time between attaining the 50% and 100% TLV alarm
points can be used to isolate a leak, increase ventilation, “safe” (that is, safely shut down) the experiment
apparatus, or other mitigative actions.   Shifting the warning and evacuation alarms to lower gas 
concentrations maintains the safety and health of the experimenters and other INL or other authorized 
personnel who might be present during the experiment work. 
Hydrogen gas is listed as a ‘simple’ asphyxiant gas by the ACGIH, rather than a ‘chemical’ asphyxiant. 
A simple asphyxiant gas is a gas that does not chemically asphyxiate humans; it merely displaces air to
cause a lack-of-oxygen asphyxiation. A chemical asphyxiant would take the place of oxygen in blood or 
prevent oxygen from its proper interaction in the lungs or bloodstream.  For simple asphyxiant gases, 
OSHA (2006) states that the definition of an oxygen deficient atmosphere is below 19.5% O2 by volume,
and that all oxygen deficient atmospheres shall be considered IDLH.  An alarm and evacuation at the 
19.5% O2 level is typically performed. However, in the case of hydrogen, the simple asphyxiant gas is 
also a flammable gas.  To obtain an oxygen decrease from the typical 20.9% to 19.5%, a simple mole
fraction of typical air (78% N2, 20.9% O2, 1% Argon and traces of other gases) to air plus another gas in a 
non-ventilated room (resulting in 72.8% N2, 19.5% O2, 0.93% Ar, and 6.7% H2) shows that about 6.7%
hydrogen at room temperature would need to be added to the non-ventilated room to reach IDLH oxygen
levels, making the LFL at 4% a larger safety concern than the asphyxiation concern.  The LFL for 
hydrogen in air is 4% by volume or 40,000 ppm.  A hydrogen detector should be set to alarm at a fraction
of the lower flammable limit (LFL) or lower explosive limit.  ISA (2003) guidance states that a
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combustible gas monitor indicating up to the LFL should be set as low as possible commensurate with the
need to avoid nuisance alarm signals.
The fraction of the LFL to use as the alarm setpoint is needed.  The NFPA (Standards 30, 45, 55, 69, and 
91) suggests that to prevent deflagrations, the combustible concentration limit be maintained at less than
25% of the LFL for the combustible gas, vapor, or mixture of gases.  Gas detection monitors shall sound 
an alarm when the system detects vapors that reach or exceed 25% of the lower flammable limit.
ANSI/ISA-TR12.24.01-1998, “Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical 
Installations Classified as Class I, Zone 0, Zone 1, or Zone 2”, Appendix D, states:
?An adequate number of sensors are installed to ensure the sensing of flammable gas or vapor in the 
building in all areas where such gas might accumulate
?sensing a gas concentration at 20% LFL or less should activate a local alarm (audible or visual or both, 
whatever is appropriate for the location) 
?sensing a gas concentration of 40% LFL or less should activate a local alarm (audible or visual or both,
whatever is appropriate for the location) and initiate automatic disconnection of power from all
electrical devices in the area that are not rated for the gas environment.
?calibrate gas detectors at least once every three months
?bypass for calibration is allowed
?the building should not have any electrically heated parts or components outside of explosion-proof
enclosures that may operate at a temperature equal to or above 80% of the ignition temperature of 
the gas or vapor
For many years, the traditional setpoints for warning alarm and evacuation alarm have been 20% of LFL 
and 40% of LFL (Anderson, 1999; TAC, 1984).  Looking for other INL-specific experiences, the 
Advanced Test Reactor uses a hydrogen gas detector in the battery bank room, where the lead-acid
batteries can evolve hydrogen gas.  The room is ventilated and has one detector that is set to give 
operators an alarm at 20% of the LFL for hydrogen in air (SDD, 1993).  The 20%-40% warning and 
evacuation alarm setpoints are also used by the American Petroleum Institute (API, 2002). 
For hydrogen with a 4% LFL in air, one-quarter of the LFL is a 1% concentration of hydrogen by volume,
or 10,000 ppm. A recent industrial trend is to set a warning alarm at a lower level, usually 10% of the
lower flammable limit, to allow the staff to mitigate the event and bring the gas concentration back to 
acceptable levels and the typical alarm level of 20 or 25% LFL (Nolan, 1996).  Some facilities have a 
special alarm function; if the gas concentration reaches 50% LFL, then the facility is shut down and de-
powered to preclude any deflagration damage (Vervalin, 1985). Confined space best practices also use
10% of the LFL or less as an acceptable limit for confined space atmospheres (ANSI, 2003a).  A 10%
LFL warning alarm is recommended for use in the laboratory.
It is also noted in Table 1 that CO is also a flammable gas, with a lower flammable limit in air of 12.5%
by volume (Kuchta, 2000).  12.5% is 125,000 ppm, and 10% of that is 12,500 ppm.  The carbon 
monoxide toxicity with a TLV of 25 ppm is a much greater hazard than the flammability of the gas. 
Considering suppression of nuisance alarms, the typical air concentrations of the gases listed in Table 1 
are not well known.  Carbon monoxide is the lowest of the values discussed, and may be the most
sensitive.  The Environmental Protection Agency states that the national primary ambient air quality 
standards for carbon monoxide are: 9 ppm for an 8-hour average concentration (not to be exceeded more
than once per year) and 35 ppm for a 1-hour average concentration (not to be exceeded more than once 
per year) (EPA, 2004).   If the air quality typically remains below 9 ppm of CO, then a 25 ppm alarm 
level (~3 times the ambient concentration) should not result in nuisance alarms.   The LFL of hydrogen
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gas in air is 4%, so reducing the LFL by 90% for a “10% LFL” warning alarm level gives 0.4% or 4,000
ppm, which should be a large enough value to preclude nuisance alarms.  Pham (1998) stated that the 
lower the monitor setpoint, the more likely that a power surge, background noise, or some other 
interference would trigger an alarm.  Keeping the alarm setpoints at or above 10% of transmitter full scale
will reduce nuisance alarms.  If more sensitivity (lower setpoint) is needed, then select a sensor with a 
small range (such as 50 ppm full range versus 200 ppm full range). 
In summary, Table 4 gives some suggested gas monitor setpoints for prudent laboratory operations.  An 
initial toxic gas warning at 50% of the TLV is used, and an evacuation alarm at 100% of the TLV
concentration is used for personnel protection.  Flammable gas warning alarms can be set at 10% of the
LFL and an evacuation alarm at 25% of the LFL. 
There is a concern about the low ppm setpoint value of carbon monoxide.  The Environmental Protection 
Agency has a CO limit of 9 ppm for an average 8-hour concentration that is not to be exceeded more than
once per year (40CFR50.8) and generally, most office buildings are below that level.  Given the
instrument accuracies in Table 2, up to plus or minus 10%, at 13 ppm that is ± 1.3 ppm, so there should 
not be a high number of spurious, nuisance alarms.  Carbon dioxide in air is on the order of a few hundred
ppm (Chou, 2000), so the Table 5 alarm setpoint of 2,500 ppm is much higher than ambient levels and 
there should not be any spurious alarms. 
It is also noted that oxygen enriched atmospheres are defined in OSHA as atmospheres containing more
than 23.5% oxygen by volume (OSHA, 2006a). These oxygen concentrations are not particularly 
hazardous to breathe for short periods of time.  Klaasen (1995) stated that short residence times of ~3 
hours in 100% oxygen atmospheres are not debilitating or life threatening to healthy adults.  The issue of 
importance for oxygen enrichment is that some materials, notably hydrocarbons such as oil, grease, and 
hydraulic fluids, are more highly flammable in high oxygen concentrations, some to the point of
spontaneous flammability in oxygen enriched atmospheres (Cote, 1991).  With oxygen oxidizer present, 
flames burn much hotter than in normal air and propagate at much greater speed; such fires often require
extra water for extinguishment.  The Compressed Gas Association gave a definition that 23% by volume
of oxygen in air would be an oxygen-enriched hazardous atmosphere; however, at the INL the OSHA 
definition is recognized.  The CGA definition is only a 2.1% oxygen increase over normal air; the OSHA 
definition is a 2.6% oxygen increase.  Even “non-flammable” textiles used in protective clothing will burn 
fiercely in as little as 30% oxygen concentration by volume  (CGA, 1992). 
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3.  Monitor Placement. 
There is some guidance available about proper placement of monitors.  The fixed point, stationary
monitor can only function if the intruding gas contacts the monitor.  Therefore, monitor placement is vital
to proper monitoring of the room or area.
Using the molecular weight of the gas in question, as shown in the data presented in Table 1, allows 
identification of gases lighter than dry air (whose MW=28.9).  Humid air is slightly less molecular
weight.  Therefore, the designer can easily identify if a gas will rise or settle when released.  In some
cases, if releasing a cold gas (perhaps a cryogenic gas), the gas will settle until it warms closer to room
temperature, and it will mix with (dilute in) room air currents as it is warming.
ANSI/ISA-RP12.13.02 states that a fixed gas detection system should be installed so that it can monitor
those parts of the plant or facility where flammable gases accidentally accumulate to create a significant 
hazard.  The rationale for selecting sensor locations should be recorded.  Factors in sensor location 
selection include: indoor or outdoor site, the location and nature of potential vapor/gas sources, chemical
and physical data of the gases or vapors, liquids with volatility need sensors near the potential sources of
release, nature and concentration of gas releases, natural and mechanical ventilation, detector installation 
locations not vulnerable to mechanical or water damage from normal operations, and locations that lend
themselves to ready maintenance and calibration.  The guidance also states that sensors should be located 
in all areas where hazardous accumulations of gas may occur. Such areas might not be close to release
points but might be areas with restricted air movement.  Heavier than air gases are likely to accumulate in 
pits, trenches, drains, and other low areas.  Lighter than air gases are more likely to accumulate in
overhead spaces, above drop ceilings, etc.  In general, sensors should be located close to any potential 
sources of major release of gas.  To avoid nuisance alarms, sensors should not be placed immediately
adjacent to equipment that may produce inconsequential leakage during normal operation. 
Inconsequential leakage might include gas bottle racks where there are tiny releases during bottle 
changeout.
Process Industry Practices standard PIP PCCA001, “Design of Combustible and Toxic Gas Detection 
Systems”, 2004, states that the detector location shall be appropriate to detect the presence of specified
combustible or toxic gases (lighter or heavier than air) in the area the detector is installed.  Point detectors
shall normally be located adjacent to identifiable, single-spot, potential gas release locations having a
significant risk of toxic or combustible gas leakage (i.e., pump and gas compressor seals, valves, etc.).
Detectors shall be protected from direct sprays of oil and other liquid.
Jessel (2002) stated that there are three approaches to monitoring: spot, area, and fence monitoring.  Spot
monitoring is locating sensors near recognized sources of leakage (valves, nozzles, flanges, bellows, etc.).
Spot monitoring makes judicious use of just a few monitors by identifying the most likely leak locations 
in the facility or system. Area monitoring means siting sensors at regular intervals throughout an area, 
similar to smoke detectors that are placed in grid patterns for fire protection. Area monitoring typically
uses a larger number of sensors than spot monitoring.  Jessel stated that for area monitoring, 500-1,000 
square feet per monitor head is often used as a rule of thumb.  TAC (1984) stated a recommendation that
at least 1 sensor cover 900 square feet per room area monitor.  Anderson (1999) stated that some 
manufacturers gave a recommendation of one sensor per 400 square feet. Obviously, there is variability
in sensor coverage and placement.  The third monitoring approach, fence or perimeter monitoring, is the
design where four or more sensors are placed at the facility periphery to alarm that hazardous gases are
leaving the site and intruding into neighboring areas. Perimeter monitoring is used more for an industrial 
complex than for a laboratory facility.
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Jessel points out that vapors from combustible liquids are always heavier than air, so they tend to stay
close to the ground.  Therefore, sensors to detect these vapors need to be close to the ground.  The TAC 
(1984) recommended heavier-than-air gas sensor placement at 20 – 26 inches above the low point or 
floor, and no higher than 42 – 48 inches.  Anderson (1999) suggested 12 – 18 inches height from the floor 
or low point, and no higher than 36 inches.  Gas sensor standards do not give specific distances. Jessel
(2002) stated that only three combustible gases are significantly lighter than air: hydrogen, ammonia, and
methane.  Unless cryogenic, these gases tend to rise toward the ceiling and can form “gas nests” (i.e., gas 
pockets between beams, etc.).  Toxic gases that are heavier than air or nearly neutral buoyancy in air, and 
are in small concentrations < 1% by volume, are moved by air currents and should be monitored at head 
height (in the breathing zone).  For combustible gases or vapors, position the sensor between the leak
source and any ignition sites if possible; if the sensor performs tasks such as de-energizing a process,
starting ventilation fans, etc., then the sensor reaction time and countermeasure timing must be taken into 
account.  Anderson (1999) and Chou (2000) stated that gases released into rooms are not predictable, and 
especially unpredictable when they are close to the density of air.  Ventilation air currents in rooms are 
usually the largest motive force for gas movement in a room.  Air currents can create anomalies in the 
expected gas movement and behavior. A sensor near an exit fan or exit duct, or at the ceiling or roof, is a
prudent practice to detect lighter-than-air gases.  Sensor placement near ventilation exit fans or outlet 
ducts is also prudent for gases with vapor densities similar to air. 
Schaeffer (1980, 1981) gives some guidance on sensor placement as well.  His work was also reproduced 
in TAC (1984) and Vervalin (1985).   The Schaeffer sketches are reproduced here on the following pages
to support the designer.  Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 depict the general behavior of a lighter-than-air gas in still 
air, a heavier-than-air gas in still air, a lighter-than-air gas under ventilation, and a heavier-than-air gas 
under ventilation.  Figures 5, 6, and 7 depict three sketches of lighter-than-air gas releases.  Figure 5 
shows good monitor placement when ventilation air is not always present – near the ceiling, near a 
ventilation air return.  In that way the sensor would detect gas going into the return duct when ventilation
was operating and would continue to function when the ventilation system was not operating.  Never 
mount a gas detector near a fresh air inlet duct, the fresh air inflow will not allow gas to reach the 
detector, and any inflowing particulate in the air flow will accumulate in the detector.  Figure 6 shows a 
poor placement of a sensor in a ventilation return air line; if ventilation stopped, the sensor would not 
detect the leak into the room for many minutes, and with ventilation operating, adding air from multiple
rooms will dilute the gas in the ventilation duct so that it might be too low in concentration to actuate the 
detector even though the gas is at a high concentration in the source room.  Figure 7 depicts the lighter-
than-air gas rising towards the ceiling, and that room air is much hotter near the ceiling.  The warm air
can delay the gas from reaching the ceiling since warmer air is less dense and density differences cause
diffusion.  Corsi (2000) described this phenomenon as the warm room and hot surfaces of the sunlit roof
or ceiling as creating a “thermal barrier”.  However, hydrogen gas is the lightest gas, and room air that is
30 or 40 F hotter than ambient will not retard hydrogen diffusion to the same extent it would retard 
ammonia or methane diffusion.  Also, if room ventilation moves this hot air, churning the hot air layer
into the rest of the room air, then the concern for sensor delay is small.
The ISA-RP12.13.02 (ANSI, 2003), which was recommended by the National Electrical Code (NFPA
70), gave this guidance on sensor placement: 
? Locate detectors above the level of ventilation openings and close to the ceiling for the detection of 
gases lighter than air
? If ceilings are compartmentalized by equipment or other obstructions, sensors should be installed in
each compartment
? Account for thermally induced flow (e.g., hot surfaces on equipment) that may affect the distribution of
gas in air
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? Place sensors in all areas where hazardous accumulations may occur; these areas may not be close to 
release points but may be in areas of restricted air movement
? Locate sensors close to potential areas of major release (to avoid nuisance alarms do not place
immediately adjacent to equipment known to produce small leaks)
? Sensor orientation may be specified by the manufacturer
At least one INL laboratory has used fog to map the room air currents to help select radiation monitor
placement (INL, 2006), and since the largest motive force for most gases is also the air currents in the
room, similar work could be performed for laboratories if there is any question about gas monitor
placement.
Figure 1.  Lighter-than-air gas release into a non-ventilated room.
Figure 2.  Heavier-than-air release into a non-ventilated room.
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Figure 3.  Lighter-than-air release into a ventilated room. Note that the air currents blanket the sensor and 
it does not detect the gas release.
Figure 4.  Heavier-than-air gas release into a ventilated room.  Note that the sensor is placed such that it
does detect the gas release.
Figure 5.  Lighter-than-air gas release into a ventilated room.  Note that the sensor placement near the air
outlet duct allows gas detection. 
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Figure 6.  Lighter-than-air gas release into a ventilation duct network.  Note that the air from other rooms 
dilutes the gas, so the concentration at the detector may be too low to trigger an alarm while the gas 
concentration in the room of release is high enough to alarm.
Figure 7.  Lighter-than-air gas release into a room with a warm ceiling. 
4. Monitor usage tips. 
Gas monitors, depending on their type, can be susceptible to blockages of the detector element (i.e., dust,
particulate from the air, water condensation, etc.), and catalyst units can be susceptible to compounds of 
silicon, phosphorous, chlorine, lead, and other elements (Nolan, 1996). Routine inspection and re-
calibration is necessary to keep the units operating correctly. Gas monitors can require reasonably 
frequent recalibration. Most of the literature examined for this task indicated that the manufacturer’s 
recommendations should be followed.  API (2002) states that gas monitors should be calibrated at a
frequency in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations, but at least once every three months.
Nolan (1996) concurs with the 3-month interval, and ANSI/ISA-TR12.24.01-1998 also stated that the gas 
detectors shall be calibrated at a frequency in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations, but 
at least once every three months.  For chemical process industry applications (sensors exposed to
temperature extremes, weather, hydrocarbon emission fouling, etc.) the three-month interval is probably a 
wise precaution to keep the protective sensors operating.  Calibration shall be performed with a known 
mixture (nominal 50% LFL recommended) of diluent and methane or other gas anticipated, in accordance
with the manufacturer’s recommendations (API, 2002).  The API also incorporates ANSI/ISA RP-12.13 
(Installation, Operation, and Maintenance of Combustible Gas Detection Instruments) by reference.
Zdankiewicz (1997) gave some suggestions for routine maintenance:
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Gas Detector Head Routine Inspection and Maintenance 
Assembly or Function Frequency Procedure
Sample connection daily tighten probe or tube fitting as 
needed
Moisture trap daily drain and clean bowl 
Flow meter daily check, adjust, replace dust filter as 
needed
Pump daily confirm operation and suction
Alarm test daily check with test switch 
Detector output daily check for excessive output level
Batteries (portable) daily check remaining life and replace 
as needed 
Alarm calibration monthly check with prepared gas sample
Span adjustment quarterly check and adjust with prepared
gas sample
Zero calibration quarterly set with only clean air present
Filter elements twice/year clean or replace as needed 
Sensor twice/year calibrate or replace
The ANSI/ISA-RP-12-13.02 (ANSI, 2003), which is referenced in NFPA Standard 70, suggested a 
regular inspection of the control panel, such as once per shift.  A regular verification of the function of the
lights, audible alarms and electronics by use of test switches was suggested, but no time interval was
given.  A typical calibration of the sensor should be performed regularly. The standard directed that 
calibration be performed in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions, using the recommended test 
kit and equipment, perform calibration on instrument commissioning and tested/re-calibrated at defined
intervals thereafter, and regular inspections for malfunctions, damage or deterioration.  Records should be
kept for each detector head.  For BCTC Bay 9, the manufacturer’s recommendations in their manuals
were 180 days for hydrogen sensors and six to twelve months for carbon dioxide monitors (Dräger, 
2002).
Anderson (1999) stated that the calibration frequency varies with the manufacturer, sensor type, and the 
particular installation.  For a catalytic bead-type sensor, a safe calibration interval can be chosen based on 
the changes in span and zero from the initial calibration, so recording these data and keeping them 
available for use are important for determining safe use of the monitors.
Chou (2000) stated that typically two calibrations are performed.  One on the zero point, and another on 
the monitor span.  For the zero point, that is, a zero concentration of the gas to be sensed, there is no
established standard to define a practical ‘zero’ value.  Many procedures call for use of dry nitrogen from
gas cylinders, but dry nitrogen is not the same as air. The best approach suggested by Chou is to zero the 
monitor using ambient, typical humidity air – provided the air can be guaranteed as clean by portable
monitors.  This is the most realistic zero reference and the water vapor in air will give a true zero point for 
monitors. Dry gas will cause the zero point to be set lower than actual and then the monitor will appear to
drift when no instrument drift has occurred.  Span calibration is the second calibration to be performed.
Chou stated that the best accuracy would be to mix target gas in background environmental air and use 
that as the calibration gas.  However, that approach is complicated and expensive.  The most popular 
method of span calibration is to use a premixed, dry calibration gas that is commercially available with a 
fixed concentration value of the target gas mixed into another bulk gas.  Some calibration gases can be 
mixed with air, others can only be mixed with nitrogen or other inert gases.  The calibration gas bottle is
fitted with a regulator and flow restrictor.  Flow rates of 600-1,000 cc/minute at just 1-2 psig are common,
with flows lasting a minute or more. Calibration gas bottle shelf life must be verified with the vendor,
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since many of these gas mixtures have short lifetimes in the bottles (gas reacts with bottle walls, etc.).
The gas sensor reads from zero concentration and gives periodic readings up to the “span gas” or
calibration gas concentration, thus the gas sensor reads through a span of concentrations.  The monitor
will be adjusted to read at the given percentage calibration gas level if the monitor gives an inaccurate
reading during the calibration activity. This adjustment should be recorded.  The span calibration is not a 
full range span, such as 0-100% LFL of a combustible gas in air.  It is just the range up to the calibration 
gas volume percentage level, typically 50% LFL for most combustible gases.  The General Monitors
corporation web site (at generalmonitors.com) gives a tutorial on calibration, and states that monitors will
give a readout of remaining life of the sensor head.  This percentage of remaining life should also be 
recorded.  When a sensor head reaches low remaining lifetime, 20% or 10% remaining, it should be 
replaced and the new head given an initial calibration.
The calibration process is to attach a gas line to the monitor and send gas of known concentration from a
bottle of calibration gas to the monitor and determine the time the monitor takes to read elevated gas 
levels, and note the highest level the monitor will read.  Therefore, the sensor must be accessible, or 
calibrations may not be performed on schedule – according to the General Monitors website
(generalmonitors.com). This calibration process works well for combustible gases mixed to some
percentage (i.e., such as the typical 50% LFL) in nitrogen or air.  Toxic gases pose more difficult 
calibration issues.  Anderson (1999) stated that two means are typically used for toxic gas monitor
calibration, one is use of toxic gas ampoules.  The ampoule approach may not be very accurate because 
ampoules are fragile and can leak, and the glass ampoule walls have been known to react with toxic gas. 
The ampoules are heated during the sealing process and heating can release contaminants from the glass, 
allowing contaminants to react later with the toxic gas after sealing has been completed.  The second toxic 
gas calibration means is the same approach as combustible gases, delivering a known (but usually very
small) concentration of the toxic gas or a similar toxic gas in a calibration gas from a cylinder to the
monitor unit and taking a span reading. 
The General Monitors web site stated that attention was needed for pits or trenches in floors, and alcoves,
roof peaks, and dormers – all of which tend to be poorly ventilated and can accumulate leakage gases.
Ventilation needs change with seasons, so all seasons must be taken into account when choosing monitor
locations.  Wiring sensors in series is often preformed because of cost savings in cabling and time, but
such an approach results in cumulative outputs, difficulty in sensor calibration and reduced safety.  One 
open circuit results in loss of all sensors, so individual wiring is costly but safety conservative.  Sensors
should not be placed in high vibration or high temperature areas; elevated levels of either vibration or
temperature can reduce the monitor lifetime.  Sensor wiring should be separate from alternating current 
wiring.  Sensor wiring near high power AC wires will need electrical shielding, and the site also states it
is good engineering practice to always used shielded (braided) cable.  The shielded cable will prevent
radio interference (i.e., walkie-talkie radios) and other interference with the sensor signals.  Dust covers
can be used in dirty areas, and splashguards in areas that are washed down or experience high levels of
annual rainfall.
Another useful piece of information noted in the literature is the set of publications from the Matheson 
Gas Company.  There are three publications that can be helpful to the designer and experimenter 
performing work for, or in, the laboratory.  The Matheson Guide to Safe Handling of Compressed Gases
(1983), the Effects of Exposure to Toxic Gases, First Aid and Medical Treatment (1988), and the 
Matheson Gas Data Book (2001) are important publications and are available at the INL technical library.
For example, the gas data book contains an appendix regarding steps to follow if a gas cylinder begins to
leak – shut the cylinder valve, and if it is safe to do so then disconnect the cylinder and move it outside
(away from building air intakes, away from building wake effects created by wind, and away from 
internal combustion engines) to allow the cylinder to safely vent its contents. Matheson also provides a 
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free downloadable pdf brochure “Safe Handling of Compressed Gases in the Laboratory and Plant” at its
web site matheson-trigas.com.
These discussions should assist the designer when selecting and choosing locations for gas monitors, and 
setting up a gas monitor maintenance program.
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APPENDIX B:  INL LABORATORY INSTRUCTION (LI) OF THE
HYDROGEN/OXYGEN GENERATING LABORATORY SYSTEM
Nuclear Science and Technology Laboratory Instruction USE TYPE  4 ECR Number: 557374
PURPOSE/SCOPE/APPLICABILITY
1. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES:
The primary objective of this project is to develop and demonstrate high-temperature steam
electrolysis for efficient hydrogen production using solid-oxide electrolysis cells. 
The Integrated Laboratory Scale (ILS) facility will demonstrate higher hydrogen production rates while 
simultaneously addressing integral issues such as multiple-stack gas manifolding, stack electrical
integration, inlet/outlet gas handling, and thermal management. Previous bench-scale tests have primarily
concentrated on quantifying material and cell performance and have not addressed larger-scale issues
such as thermal management (feed-stock heating and high-temperature gas handling), multiple-stack hot-
zone design, multiple-stack electrical configurations, and other “integral” issues.  The Integrated
Laboratory Scale (ILS) experiment is designed to address these larger-scale integral issues.  For the
multiple-stack tests that will be performed in the ILS, inlet gas flows will be preheated upstream of the
primary hot zone.  The ILS will also implement heat recuperation and hydrogen recycle as practical.
2. PROJECT APPROACH:
The ILS electrolyzer will consist of three modules, each comprised of four 60-cell stacks.  Figure 1 is a 
CAD rendering of one 4-stack module.  All three modules will be located within a single hot zone as
shown in Figure 2.  Typical operating temperature for the hot zone is 830ºC.  The electrolysis modules
require support systems supplying electrical power for electrolysis, a feedstock gas mixture of hydrogen
and steam, a sweep gas, and appropriate exhaust handling.  The gas handling system must include means
for controlled steam generation, mixing hydrogen (and possibly nitrogen) with the steam, feedstock and
product dew point measurements, heating the feedstock and sweep gas to the appropriate electrolysis
temperature, cooling the electrolysis product stream, condensing any residual steam out of the product
stream, and venting both the hydrogen product and sweep gas stream.
The ILS is designed such that each electrolysis module has its own independent support and 
instrumentation system.  The feedstock and product gas streams for each electrolysis module are 
monitored and controlled separately and thus the inlet and outlet gas composition and flow rate is 
known independently for each module.  If a module fails during operation, that particular module
can be shut down without affecting the safe performance or testing of the other modules.  And 
since each module is operated and monitored separately, each module can support different 
operating conditions (e.g., gas flow rates, operating voltage, current density, etc.) 
simultaneously.  In this way, a test matrix covering a wide range of operating conditions can be 
covered more quickly. 
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Figure 1. ILS 4-Stack Module. Figure 2. THE ILS Hot Zone.
3.. PROJECT/ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION:
ILS MECHANICAL DESIGN
The Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) for the ILS is shown in Figures 3.  Figure 4 presents a 
rendering of the ILS configuration from various viewpoints.  As discussed above, separate parallel 
support systems are included for each electrolysis module.  All three parallel support systems are depicted
in Figures 3 and 4.    Note that there is only one sweep-gas stream emerging from the hot-zone enclosure.
This one stream handles sweep-gas exhaust for all three modules.
ILS DESIGN 
In Fig. 3 and 4, the hydrogen/steam feedstock is represented by the color magenta, the product stream 















































































































































































































































Figure 3.  Piping and Instrumentation Diagram.
Front View     Rear View 
Figure 4.  Rendering of the INL ILS facility.
HIGH TEMPERATURE ELECTROLYSIS PROCESS 
iquid water feedstock is fed at a controlled rate into the system.  The water is then vaporized and slightly 
superheated in an in-line electrically powered steam generator.  The steam exiting the steam generator is
mixed with hydrogen (and possibly nitrogen), which is required on the inlet side of the stack in order to
maintain reducing conditions at the steam/hydrogen electrode.  The inlet hydrogen will be supplied from a
compressed-gas cylinder. The hydrogen flow rate is controlled by a mass-flow controller coupled to the
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Data Acquisition and Control System (DACS).  The inlet hydrogen must be heated to the steam generator
outlet temperature in order to prevent cooling of the steam and possible steam condensation. Downstream
of the mixing point, the temperature, pressure, and dew-point temperature of the gas mixtures are 
measured.  Absolute pressure is directly measured at each dew-point measurement station to allow 
accurate determination of the steam mole fraction.  Precise measurement of the dew-point and pressure 
allows for independent determination of the inlet gas composition.  A high-temperature electrically
powered in-line superheater then boosts the feedstock stream to the final electrolyzer operating
temperature, 800° - 830°C.
The gas mixture exiting the electrolyzer will be significantly enriched in hydrogen, typically to at 
least 50% hydrogen mole fraction.  The product stream is first cooled via natural convection 
using sections of finned tubing in ambient air.  The product stream temperature exiting this
cooler is controlled such that no condensation can occur.  Then the product gas mixture enters 
the outlet dew-point measurement station.  The outlet hydrogen/steam flow then enters a 
condenser where the vast majority of the residual steam is removed.  The rate of water 
condensation will be monitored with an online measuring system, providing an additional 
independent measure of steam consumption.  At this point, the product stream will be ambient-
temperature, saturated hydrogen gas (plus possibly some nitrogen), with about 3% residual water 
vapor.  The flow rate of this product gas will be measured with a low-pressure-drop mass flow
transducer.  Comparison of the condensate and product mass flow rates with the electrolyzer 
inlet mass flow rates helps quantify any stack leakage that may occur.  The hydrogen product 
will then be vented from the building.
Air will be used as a sweep gas for the ILS system. Compressed air, after flowing through moisture and
debris filters, flows through a mass-flow controller and into an electrically powered superheater to preheat
the inlet air to the stack operating temperature. Downstream of the electrolyzer, the hot oxygen-enriched 
air stream is vented from the building.
For hydrogen recycle, a line will be tapped upstream of the vent to provide hydrogen to be mixed with the
inlet steam feedstock for the electrolysis process.  Again, the remaining hydrogen product will be vented
from the building. 
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Figure 5.  UniSim ILS process model.
Detailed process flow sheets were developed for the ILS design using the commercial system-analysis
code UniSim.  Figure 5 is a diagram of the system simulated by UniSim. These flow sheets include all of
the components that will be present in the actual ILS system such as pumps, heat exchangers, and the
electrolyzer.  The UniSim simulations provided process temperature, mixture compositions, and flow 
rates for all of the flow streams.  Process information obtained from the model for the nominal and
extreme design cases are listed in Table 1 and Table 2. The values in Table 1 are the result of the UniSim 
simulation. This simulation code is an intuitive and interactive process modeling tool that creates steady-
state and dynamic models for the project design, performance monitoring, troubleshooting, operational
improvement, business planning and asset management. It was not an estimated maximum production 
rate.   Component and total requirements are listed in Table 3.  Note that these values are totals for the 
three parallel systems.
Table 1.  UniSim simulation process information. 
Nominal Design Case Extreme Design Case 
Area Specific Resistance (ASR) (ohm cm2) 1.5 1.0
Current Density (amps/cm2) 0.25 0.37
Per-cell Voltage (thermal neutral, volts) 1.283 1.283
Electrolysis Power (kW) 14.54 21.8
Hydrogen Production Rate (NL/hr) 4735 7103
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(g/s) H2 H2O O2 N2
Nominal Design Case (ASR = 1.5 ohm cm2)
1 15.56 2.116 0 1 0 0
2 112.6 2.116 0 1 0 0
3 113.5 0.0263 1 0 0 0
4 830 2.142 0.1 0.9 n/a n/a
5 830 1.202 0.55 0.45 n/a n/a
6 92 1.202 0.55 0.45 n/a n/a
7 32 0.1948 0.9627 0.0373 n/a n/a
8 32 1.008 0 1 0 0
9 25.28 50.00 0.04 0.0016 0.2008 0.7576
10 25 1.4635 0.2095 0.7905
11 830 1.4635 0.2095 0.7905
12 830 2.403 0 0 0.5 0.5
13 39.58 139.5 0.214 0.786
Extreme Design Case (ASR = 1.0 ohm cm2)
1 15.56 3.173 0 1 0 0
2 112.6 3.173 0 1 0 0
3 113.5 0.0395 1 0 0 0
4 830 3.213 0.1 0.9 n/a n/a
5 830 1.804 0.55 0.45 n/a n/a
6 92.0 1.804 0.55 0.45 n/a n/a
7 32 0.2922 0.9627 0.0373 n/a n/a
8 32 1.512 0 1 n/a n/a
9 25.28 75.06 0.04 0.0016 0.2008 0.7576
10 25 2.195 0.2095 0.7905
11 830 2.195 0.2095 0.7905
12 830 3.604 0.5 0.5
13 39.58 209.3 0.214 0.786
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Table 3.  UniSim simulation component-specific utility requirements information.
Primary Utility Requirements 
Component Nominal Design Case 
(ASR = 1.5 ohm cm2)
Extreme Design Case 
(ASR = 1.0 ohm cm2)
Feed Water Metering Pump (kW) 0.0002 0.0003
Water Requirement (gm/s) 2.116 3.173
Steam Generator (kW) 5.637 8.455
Steam/Hydrogen Superheater (kW) 3.511 5.266
Hot Zone Guard Heaters (kW) 10 10
Steam/Hydrogen Cooler (duty, kW) 3.226 4.839
Cooling Air Requirement (gm/s) 120 180
Steam/Hydrogen Condenser (duty, kW) 2.705 4.058
Cooling Water Requirement (gm/s) 44.1 66
Air Sweep Gas Compressor (kW) 0.077 0.1155
Air Sweep Gas Superheater (kW) 1.2 1.801
Electrolyzer (kW) 14.54 21.8
Total Electrical (kW) 35.0 47.5
Total Water, including feedstock (gm/s) 46.2 69.2
INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROL CONFIGURATION
The instrumentation and control system for the ILS will be comprised of: 
? Temperature measurement and control – temperature measurements will be obtained using
thermocouples wired into the DASC and temperature control will be performed using LabVIEW 
software (see below).
? Pressure measurement – pressure measurements will be obtained from pressure transducers.
? Flow rate measurement and control (gas and liquid) – flow rates for both gases and liquids will be 
obtained from mass flow controllers and control will be performed with LabVIEW software.
? Dew-point measurement – dew-point measurements will be obtained with humidity and
temperature sensors.
? Electrolysis electrical power supply and control – electrical power will be controlled with 
programmable power supplies; 
? Data acquisition and control system (DACS) - signals from all thermocouple channels, mass-flow
controllers, pressure transducers, and cell voltage taps will be wired into a modular DACS.
Programmable power supplies will also be configured for control and monitoring by the DACS
system. The DASC serves as a power supply, communication conduit, and chassis control circuit 
for managing various analog signal-conditioning modules as well as analog signal output
modules.
? Computer control - control of the above DACS system will be implemented using a personal 
computer and the LabVIEW software. In addition to the DACS, the LabVIEW software will also 
coordinate communications and control of the various serial interface devices as well.  LabVIEW
programs will serve as the graphical user interface for operation and control of the ILS, provide 
on-screen real-time graphical data representation, and will log experimental test data to disk. 
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4. MAJOR EQUIPMENT USED IN ACTIVITY:
Major Item Instruction Manual Instruction Manual location 
Compressed gas cylinders 




Hot Zone None (in-house design using Watlow Ceramic heaters) 
Ceramic heater instruction
sheets are located in File
Cabinet
Hot Zone Lid Screw Jacks
Joyce/Dayton Corp.
Operation and Maintenance 
manual for Joyce/Dayton
Screw Jacks FB173-9/06
File cabinet under BCTC 
Color Laser HP 5550DN 







None (in-house design) NA
DC Power Supply No. 1 (Hot
Zone ICHS Fiber Embedded
Guard Heaters)
DC Power Supplies Nos. 2, 3 
& 4 (Modules 1, 2, & 3
[stacks])
Lambda EMI Instruction
Manual for 10kW – 15 kW 
ESS Power Supply 83-481-
004
File cabinet in the high-bay 
on the south wall of the office
next to the office door 
DC Power Supplies Nos. 5, 6,






File cabinet in the high-bay 
on the south wall of the office
next to the office door 
DC Power Supplies Nos. 8, 9 
&10 (Steam Generator – 
Bottom)
Lambda EMI Operator
Manual for EMS Power 
Supply 83-473-000 Revision 
L
File cabinet in the high-
bay on the south wall of 
the office next to the office
door
DC Power Supplies Nos. 11, 
12, & 13 (Steam
Superheaters)
Lambda Americas Technical
Manual for 2U GenesysTM
3..3 kW Programmable DC 
Power Supplies Document:
83-503-001 rev B) 
File cabinet in the high-bay 
on the south wall of the office
next to the office door 
Mass Flow Controllers Bronkhorst Coriolis MassFlow Meters manuals (TBD) 
File cabinet in the high-bay 
on the south wall of the office
next to the office door 
Air compressor
Ingersol Rand SS3L3
Owner’s Manual with Parts
List CCN: 22204929, Rev A, 
October 2002
File cabinet under BCTC 
Color Laser HP 5550DN 
Printer (near deep sink on
west wall) 




File cabinet in the high-
bay on the south wall of 
the office next to the office
door
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Deionized water tank None. replaced by vendor as required NA
5. ACTIVITY LOCATION BY AREA, BUILDING NUMBER AND LAB ROOM 
NUMBER:
REC 670-BCTC Bay 9
6. ACTIVITY QUALITY LEVEL AND QL DATABASE NUMBER: 
Quality Level 3, Database No. STC-000029 
7. ACTIVITY LAB MANAGER, LABORATORY SPACE COORDINATOR, AND 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR:
Laboratory Manager: James R. Wolf
Laboratory Space Coordinator: Kevin G. DeWall 


























possible, do not lift more
than 50 lbs. get help to 
move heavy cylinders, do
not bend and twist while 
lifting. Use the upright
spin roll to move




valve cap is in place. Use


























Do not use oil on threads, 
use correct gages, stand 










Store in designated 
storage areas, secure
cylinders to prevent 
falling over, protect from
direct sunlight, segregate 
flammable gases and 
oxidizers with a fire
barrier or by a distance of
20 feet. Move cylinders
to storage when cylinders
are not in use. Store with
caps on, assure cylinders
are labeled correctly and 
have a full or empty tag, 
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O2 gas is vented directly 
outside of the laboratory; 
laboratory monitoring
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Upset or utility failure 
will not result in a 
situation that requires 
emergency personnel to 
take action.  Laboratory 
gas monitoring system
will shutdown experiment
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6 months.  The 
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immediate work area 
Safety glasses,
nitrile gloves
and lab coats 
74
Table 2.02. 
Hazard scenarios that require mitigation. 
Buildup of a potentially explosive hydrogen gas mixture 
Hydrogen gas mixed with air can create an explosive hazard.  This potential hazard will be 
mitigated by confining the hydrogen gas within a fully sealed flow system.  The tubing and 
components through which hydrogen will flow will be fully leak-checked before operation.  During
electrolysis testing, a small amount of hydrogen gas will be mixed with steam, heated and sent to the
electrolysis cells.  Electrolysis generated hydrogen will increase outlet hydrogen concentrations to 
above 50% hydrogen mole fraction, with the remainder being residual steam. The condenser removes
the residual steam and the hydrogen product will then be vented from the building. The following
possible hazard scenarios are considered: 
? Accidental release of hydrogen from a single compressed gas cylinder.  In this case, the 
laboratory air in BCTC Bay 9 (approximately 55,000 ft3) would achieve a hydrogen
concentration of less than 0.5%, assuming it is uniformly distributed and taking no credit for
air turnover in the lab from the ventilation system. This is well below the LFL of 4%. 
? Mixing of air and hydrogen during startup. Heated air is used to purge the supply lines from the
dew-point sensors to the outlet of the modules of impurities that may accumulate during 
fabrication, assembly, maintenance or repairs. The air used for this purge must be removed
from the system before hydrogen is introduced to preclude the unsafe mixing of air and 
hydrogen to a combustible combination. To preclude this from occurring, the air supply line
valves AND the hydrogen supply line valves for each module that control gas inlet to the 
modules, are controlled by key-locked valves with key control by the PI. One valve on each
module must be closed and locked so that only one gas can be supplied to the dew-point
sensors. An Experiment Test Plan will be developed for each production test that will describe
procedures for start-up and operation of the system to include the conduct of the hot-air purge 
and operation of these valves. Additionally, upon completion of the heated air purge, the 
hydrogen inlet supply line from the dew-point sensors to the module outlets are purged with 
nitrogen to remove residual air. 
? Leakage of electrolytically produced hydrogen.  At a high hydrogen production rate from the 
ILS of 9.2 m3/hr (this production rate value is not intended to establish a maximum allowable
production rate), it would take 7 hours to reach the LFL of 4%, assuming that all the hydrogen 
produced is leaked into the laboratory space, ignoring ventilation and hydrogen buoyancy
effects, etc. 
? Mechanical failure of the electrolysis cell (leakage of hydrogen from the cathode side of the
cell (hydrogen/steam) to the anode side (air) during heat up).  This hazard will be mitigated by 
supplying an air flow to the anode side of the electrolysis cell during heat up that will ensure 
that, even if the hydrogen mixes with air, the composition of the hydrogen/air mixture well 
below 4% hydrogen.  Once the hot zone achieves temperatures above ~550 ?C (auto-ignition
temperature for hydrogen) the explosion potential no longer exists, since any hydrogen that
mixes with air at high temperature will immediately react with the oxygen in a simple diffusion
flame, with no potential for buildup or explosion.
? The potential explosion hazard associated with the use and production of hydrogen gas will be
further mitigated by the means of the laboratory gas monitoring system.  A hydrogen sensor is 
located above the ILS at the ceiling level.  This system will provide a warning alarm at 10% of
the LFL to alert laboratory personnel of a problem and provide sufficient time to correct the 
problem or shut down the ILS prior to reaching the evacuation level.  The system will provide 
an evacuation alarm at 25% of the LFL.  At this level, automatic shut-off valves will be 
activated to terminate inlet hydrogen flow.  In addition, relays will open on the electrolyzer
power to put the electrolyzer in open-cell status, with zero hydrogen production.  This
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contingency will minimize risk associated with unattended operation. 
Buildup of high oxygen levels
Elevated oxygen levels have the potential to make other materials more flammable.  Oxygen-
enriched atmospheres are defined as those containing more than 23.5% oxygen by volume.
Electrolytically generated oxygen can increase outlet oxygen concentrations to levels as high as 50% 
oxygen mole fraction.  This oxygen-enriched air stream will be vented from the building.  The
hydrogen vent and oxygen vent have been placed more than 20 feet apart. 
? One possible hazard scenario would involve leakage of electrolytically produced oxygen into 
the laboratory.  At a high production rate of 3.8 m3/hr (this production rate is not intended to
establish a maximum allowable production rate), it would take 11 hours to reach the enriched 
oxygen limit of 23.5% in the laboratory, assuming that all the oxygen produced is leaked into 
the laboratory space and initial oxygen levels are normal atmospheric concentrations (20.9%) 
and that no fresh air is introduced into the laboratory.
? The potential fire hazard associated with the use and production of oxygen gas will be further
mitigated by the means of the laboratory gas monitoring system. An oxygen sensor is located 
near the ILS.  This system will provide a warning alarm at 22.5% enriched oxygen to alert
laboratory personnel of a problem and provide sufficient time to correct the problem or shut 
down the ILS prior to reaching the evacuation level.  The system will provide an evacuation 
alarm at 23.5% enriched oxygen.  At this level, automatic shut-off valves will be activated to 
terminate inlet hydrogen flow.  In addition, relays will open on the electrolyzer power to put
the electrolyzer in open-cell status, with zero oxygen production.  This contingency will
minimize risk associated with unattended operation. 
Evacuation alarm procedure
If a gas hazard evacuation alarm sounds, the researchers will exit the laboratory immediately.  The
procedures in GDE-252, BCTC Bay 9 Emergency Response Guide, will be followed in the event of 
hazardous gas alarm activation in the laboratory.
Compressed gas hazards
Compressed gas hazards will be mitigated by following the procedures outlined in JSA# 56-03-
INEEL, Compressed Gas Cylinder Handling.  Researchers will stay current with compressed gas
training (TRN1041).  In addition, the gas-flow system is designed to be inherently safe with regard to
over-pressurization events.
? Maximum line pressure will be 40 psig, which is where the gas-bottle regulators will be set.
Non-adjustable relief valves with a relief pressure of 50 psig are located immediately down 
stream of each regulator to guard against the unlikely event of regulator failure exposing the
system to pressures higher than the maximum rated regulator outlet pressure.
? The mass-flow meters and tubing downstream of the regulators and upstream of the mass-flow
controllers are rated at 275 psig or greater.  The tubing downstream of the mass-flow
controllers to the external building vents does not contain valves or other significant flow
restrictions.  Therefore, the system through steam generators, superheaters, and other heat
exchangers will operate at very low pressures (near atmospheric).
? The number of gas cylinders in the laboratory will be limited to the cylinders that are directly
plumbed into an experiment plus an equal number of backup cylinders.  Further, the maximum
quantity of hydrogen gas in BCTC Bay 9 (cylinders and experiments) will be limited to 2,000
standard cubic feet. 
? Leak tests are conducted upon installation of the system and upon start-up.
Process heater hazards
Much of the ILS operates at significantly elevated temperatures presenting potential hazards to
personnel and equipment.
? Process heaters (steam generators, superheaters, air heater, and electrolysis hot zone) are in-
house designs controlled by the ILS DACS.  There is the possibility that heaters could overheat
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if the computer-based control failed (power surge for example).  This does not represent a
safety hazard but heaters could fail.  Heaters are designed to handle the maximum temperatures
that could be produced under steady state, full power operation.  The heaters are heavily
insulated and as described previously, the tubing system has no significant flow restrictions 
through the heaters so over-pressurization is not possible.  Also, the heater power supplies 
allow users to set maximum voltage or current levels.
? Whenever any ILS heaters are in operation, “Caution Hot” signs will be posted and access to
exposed high-temperature surfaces will be restricted.
Electrical hazards
The ILS includes 480-volt and 208-volt 3-phase input power and 208-volt and 120-volt single-
phase power.     The transformer and distribution panels are mounted on the ILS skid.
? The ILS transformer and distribution system were assembled by qualified electricians.
? A single 200-amp 480-volt 3-phase tube-and-sleeve plug allows all power to the ILS to be
disconnected at a single point.  This allows simple lockout-tagout procedures.  Operation of 
switches and/or circuit breakers above 240-volt phase-to-phase will be performed only by
personnel with appropriate training, using appropriate PPE.
Unattended experiments 
The ILS has been designed to be passively safe for unattended operation.  The design incorporates 
a UPS system for the data acquisition/system controller to operate through short-term power outages. 
In the case of a long-term power failure such that the system-controller computer fails, the heaters 
simply cool down and the gas flow stops, so no hazard exists even if the power subsequently comes
back on.  The hazardous gas alarm system will automatically isolate hazardous gas flow and bring the 
ILS to a safe state in the event of an evacuation alarm during periods of unattended operation.  The use 
of form 420.10 is not required.












BCTC Bay 9 8 ft3/yr Trash receptacles Routine trash collection 
Metal shavings BCTC Bay 9 < 0.1 ft3/yr Trash receptacles Routine trash collection 
List any special needs/requirements for storage and handling wastes.
 None. 
If a spill occurs, how will it be cleaned up? 
Notify WGS and Facility Project Manager (FPM) 
Describe anything else that may be relevant for waste disposal purposes. 
      NA 
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Training Required 
Training of Project Personnel 








































SMJS992L Agents Which 











Additional LIs Supporting this LI:
JSA #76-06-BCTC Assembly of Experimental Systems and Maintenance of Test Equipment
Co-located Research Activities for this LI:? ? ? ? ?
IHR#1162-06-BCTC, High-Temperature Corrosion Loop For  Fuel Cells 
IHR#1181-06-BCTC, High Temperature Electrolysis
IHR#1089-05-MSN-M1, Thermal Science Research
? ? ? ? ?
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FACILITY CONDITIONS
The DrägerGuard Safety Gas Monitoring System installed in BCTC Bay 9 must be
operational and calibrated. 
INSTRUCTIONS
Specific Experiment Test Plan 
Equipment manuals and instructions are maintained in the file cabinet under the printer.




Operations will not proceed under abnormal conditions unless approved by the Laboratory Manager, as 
appropriate, and the work remains within the bounds of this Laboratory Instruction. If a gas hazard
evacuation alarm sounds, the researchers will exit the laboratory immediately.  The procedures in GDE-
252, BCTC Bay 9 Emergency Response Guide, will be followed in the event of hazardous gas alarm
activation in the laboratory.
RECORDS
Laboratory Notebooks, computer disks and computer files, and archives 
Pressure Vessel Inspection Certificate 






Authority Retention Period 
Project case
Files 8406 RD1-A-2
Level II: Cutoff after
project/program completion,
cancellation, or termination.




GDE-252, BCTC Bay 9 Emergency Response Guide 
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APPENDIXES (such as forms 420.07, 420.11, 440.37, and 420.10 as 
applicable)
None
80
